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HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE JUDICIAL SELECTION PROCESS
IN THE UNITED STATES: IS THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM IN
PENNSYLVANIA UNJUSTIFIED?
MADAME JUSTICE SANDRA SCHULTZ NEWMAN*
& DANIEL MARK ISAACS**
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE effective functioning of the dispute resolution process in our soci-
ety requires an independent and accountable judiciary. It is, there-
fore, not surprising that the method for identifying and selecting justices
and judges has been the subject of controversy since the early history of
our nation. 1
* Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court (1996 to present); Judge of the
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court (1994 to 1996). J.D., 1972, Villanova
University School of Law; M.A., 1969, Temple University; B.S., 1959, Drexel
University.
** J.D., 1991, Brooklyn Law School; B.A., 1988, Franklin & Marshall College.
The authors wish to thank Scott Friedman, law clerk to Justice Newman, for his
assistance in editing this Article.
1. Compare THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 487-88 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry
Cabot Lodge ed., 1888), with 1 THOMAS JEFFERSON, Autobiography of Thomas Jefferson,
in JEFFERSON'S COMPLETE WORS 1, 81 (H.A. Washington ed., Washington, D.C.,
Taylor & Maury 1853). According to Hamilton:
[I]ndependence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the Constitu-
tion and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill humors,
which the arts of designing men, or the influence of particular conjunc-
tures sometimes disseminate among the people themselves, and which,
though they speedily give place to better information, and more deliber-
ate reflection, have a tendency, in the meantime, to occasion dangerous
innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the minor
party in the community.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra, at 231. On the subject of judges' independence,
Jefferson wrote:
[O]ur judges are effectually independent of the nation. But this ought
not to be. I would not, indeed, make them dependent on the Executive
authority, as they formerly were in England; but I deem it indispensable
to the continuance of this government, that they should be submitted to
some practical and impartial control; and that this, to be imparted, must
be compounded of a mixture of State and Federal authorities. It is not
enough that honest men are appointed Judges. All know the influence of
interest on the mind of man, and how unconsciously his judgment is
warped by that influence.
1
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On June 27, 2002, in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,2 the
United States Supreme Court entered the fray when it commented on the
propriety of the election of justices and judges in holding that a state may
not "prohibit candidates for judicial election in that state from announc-
ing their views on disputed legal and political issues." 3 In reaching its de-
termination that the content-based limitation on speech failed to meet
strict scrutiny, 4 the Court discussed the "obvious tension" between the
state's constitutional requirements for the popular election ofjustices and
judges and limitations on the speech of those candidates for judicial of-
fice.5 Indeed, the Court explained that the "disparity is perhaps unsur-
prising, since the [American Bar Association], which originated the
[limitation], has long been an opponent of judicial elections."6 The
Court pointed out, though, that most states select state justices and judges
through elections. 7 Accordingly, the Court found that "[i]f the State
chooses to tap the energy and the legitimizing power of the democratic
THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE WRITINGS OF THOMASJEFFERSON 121 (Andrew A. Lipscomb
ed., 1904).
2. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
3. Id. at 768. The Court addressed the constitutionality of a provision of the
Minnesota Code of Judicial Conduct, which provided that a "candidate for a judi-
cial office, including an incumbent [justice or] judge," shall not "announce his or
her views on disputed legal or political issues." Id. (quoting MINN. CODE OF JUDI-
CIAL CONDUCT, Canon 5(A) (3) (d) (i) (2000) (the "Announce Clause")). The Min-
nesota provision originated from Canon 7(B) of the 1972 American Bar
Association (ABA) Model Code of Judicial Conduct.
4. See id. at 774-75 (providing that strict scrutiny requires courts to consider
whether the statute at issue is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest).
5. See id. at 787 (discussing controversy of state requirement). After signifi-
cant analysis, the Court held that the state statute failed to meet strict scrutiny and
therefore violated the First Amendment. See id. at 788.
6. Id. at 787.
7. See id. at 786 (citing American Judicature Society, Judicial Selection in the
States: Appellate and GeneralJurisdiction Courts (Apr. 2002)) (" [Thirty-one] States...
select some or all of their appellate and general-jurisdiction [justices and] judges
by election."). The American Judicature Society (AJS) identifies itself as follows:
"Founded in 1913, AJS is an independent national nonprofit organization of
judges, lawyers, and lay members of the public who support improvements in the
justice system at all levels. Its work includes improving judicial selection methods
and promoting the highest standard of conduct and ethics in the courts." Ameri-
can Judicature Society, AJS to Administer Devitt Award, available at http://www.us
courts.gov/ttb/julttb/devitt.htm (July 1995). The AJS has researched the methods
ofjudicial selection and set forth their results in several charts. See American Judi-
cature Society, Judicial Selection in the States: Appellate and General Jurisdiction Courts,
available at http://www.ajs.org/js/judicialselectioncharts.pdf (last visited Oct. 22,
2003). Throughout this Article, the authors refer to the Appendix, which cites the
statutes and constitutions that govern the judicial selection method and process in
the United States. We credit the work of AJS, whose research informed this
Article.
[Vol. 49: p. I
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process, it must accord the participants in that process . . . the First
Amendment rights that attach to their roles."
8
In contrast to the Republican Party of Minnesota majority, Justice
O'Connor used her concurring opinion to express her belief that "the
very practice of electing judges undermines . . . [the perception of an
impartial judiciary]."9 She posited that, "if judges are subject to regular
elections[,] they are likely to feel that they have at least some personal
stake in the outcome of every publicized case" because they will be "aware
that if the public is not satisfied with the outcome of a particular case, it
could hurt [the judge's] reelection prospects." 10
Justice O'Connor also contended that judicial candidates who must
raise significant sums of money are likely to feel indebted to those who
make campaign contributions.'1 She explained that "[b]y the beginning
of the 20th century ... elected judiciaries increasingly came to be viewed
as incompetent and corrupt, and criticism of partisan judicial elections
mounted."12 Justice O'Connor concluded by rejecting the complaints of
states that have had to restrict speech to prevent justices and judges from
being impartial because those states, she reasoned, have no one to blame
but themselves for leaving in place systems for the election of justices and
judges that engender judicial bias.'13
8. Repub. Party of Minn., 536 U.S. at 788 (quoting Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S.
312, 349 (1991)). Perhaps because the Supreme Court in Republican Party of Min-
nesota ruled an ABA Canon unconstitutional, the new ABA president is willing to
consider options other than the elimination of elections as a means to maintain
and improve the quality of the justices and judges that now serve our states. SeeJeff
Blumenthal, Madeira to Head Commission on Judicial Elections, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER,
Aug. 19, 2002, at 3 (reporting that new ABA president committed to judicial
reform).
9. Repub. Party of Minn., 536 U.S. at 788 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
10. Id. at 788-89 (recognizing influence of potential loss of campaign funding
would have on judges' possible determinations in cases). Justice O'Connor noted
that "even ifjudges were able to refrain from favoring donors, the mere possibility
that judges' decisions may be motivated by the desire to repay campaign contribu-
tors is likely to undermine the public confidence in the judiciary." Id. at 790 (cit-
ing Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research, Inc. & American Viewpoint, National
Public Opinion Survey Frequency Questionnaire 4, 7 (Oct. 30 - Nov. 7, 2001), available
at http://www.justiceatstake.org/files/JASNationalSurveyResults.pdf (describing
"survey results indicating that 76 percent of registered voters believe that campaign
contributions influence judicial decisions [and] that two-thirds of registered voters
believe individuals and groups who give money to judicial candidates often receive
favorable treatment"). Justice O'Connor also cites a law review article, relating
"anecdotes of lawyers who felt that their contributions to judicial campaigns af-
fected their chance of success in court." Id. (citing David Barnhizer, "On the Make".
Campaign Funding and the Corrupting of the American Judiciary, 50 CATH. U. L. REV.
361, 378-79 (2001)).
11. See id. at 790 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (acknowledging presumption of
obligation judges may feel after accepting donations).
12. Id. at 791 (citing Steven P. Croley, The Majoitarian Difficulty: Elective Judi-
ciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 723 (1995)).
13. See id. at 792 (displaying no sympathy for states that ruling adversely
affects).
3
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The elected judiciary of Pennsylvania 14 holds itself to very high moral
standards, accepting that the right to serve comes from the people they
serve. Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion, acknowledged that
elected justices and judges, like most appointed jurists, are generally of the
highest integrity.' 5 He wrote:
In resolving this case .. . we should refrain from criticism of the
State's choice to use open elections to select those persons most
likely to achieve judicial excellence. States are free to choose this
mechanism rather than, say, appointment and confirmation. By
condemning judicial elections across the board, we implicitly
condemn countless elected state judges and without warrant.
Many of them, despite the difficulties imposed by the election
system, have discovered in the law the enlightenment, instruc-
tion, and inspiration that make them independent-minded and
faithful jurists of real integrity. We should not, even by inadver-
tence, "impute to judges a lack of firmness, wisdom, or honor."' 6
The divergent opinions of the justices in Republican Party of Minnesota,
addressing the propriety of judicial speech, highlighted the compelling
issues involved in the selection of justices and judges. 17 The particular
methods used by states to select justices and judges have varied with the
passage of time. 18 While those methods might reflect the societal and po-
litical fashions of their age, fundamental but seemingly competing themes
exist, including: the independence of the judiciary from political interfer-
ence, the need for accountability to the public and the constitutional con-
cern for the protection of individual rights. This Article traces the early
history of the selection of justices and judges, identifies the manner in
which states currently choose their justices and judges and discusses the
pros and cons of each approach.
14. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3131 (a) (2003) (providing that justices and
judges in all Pennsylvania courts are elected in partisan elections).
15. See Repub. Party of Minn., 536 U.S. at 796 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (not-
ing elected judges do have integrity).
16. Id. at 795-96 (citing Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 273 (1941)).
17. See generally id. at 797-821 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing selection of
judges).
18. See id. at 821 (citing P. MCFADDEN, ELECTINGJUSTICE: THE LAW AND ETHICS
OFJUDICIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 86 (1990); Brief of Amicus Curiae Conference of
Chief Justices in Support of Respondent, 2002 WL 257559 (Feb. 19, 2002) ("For
more than three-quarters of a century, States... have endeavored, through experi-
ment tested by experience, to balance the constitutional interests in judicial integ-
rity and free expression within the unique setting of an elected judiciary.").
[Vol. 49: p. I
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II. HISTORY OF THE JUDICIAL SELECTION PROCESS
The evolution of judicial selection in the common law system is well
documented.19 Nevertheless, when evaluating the competing methods for
the selection of justices and judges, it is useful to consider their historical
origins. Early law in the Western tradition established the antecedents of
the methods employed today in the selection of justices and judges.
During the reign of William the Conqueror from 1066 until his death
in 1087, the judicial function was an integral part of the Curia Regis, the
King's Court.21 Cases dealing with royal law were heard and decided by
the King sitting with counselors of his selection. 2 1 A separate judiciary did
not come into being until after William's death. 22 Eventually, the dispute
resolution function was increasingly delegated to justices who were not
necessarily the King's personal advisors.
23
At about the same time, the law merchant was developing as a secon-
dary component of the dispute resolution process. 24 Law merchant
judges were laymen rather than professional jurists. They were elected by
the merchants from among their number, or chosen by the head of a
merchants' or tradesmen's guild with the advice of the members. 25 As
time progressed, the King's appointed judges absorbed commercial mat-
ters.2 6 The memory of elected and committee-appointedjudges, however,
remained in the legal subconscious, to resurface in more recent times.
19. See EvAN HAYNES, SELECTION AND TENURE OFJUDGES 101-35 (1944) (outlin-
ing states' judicial selection process over years); see also Larry C. Berkson, Judicial
Selection in the United States: A Special Report, 64 JUDICATURE 176 (1980) (discussing
evolution of selection process).
20. See generally DAVID C. DouGLAs, WILLIAM THE CONQUEROR (1964) (discuss-
ing role of judicial function during age of kings).
21. See id. at 287 ("The duty of his council was... in the most general sense,
to advise the king.., and the king... would always wish to secure the support of
the men who alone could make his rule effective.").
22. See id. at 287-88 ("The essence of his government was a personal monar-
chy" and "not until after William's death was there to be evolved out of his court
specialized bodies composed of men charged with particular fiscal and judicial
duties.... [T]he later courts of law were offshoots of the curia.").
23. See id. at 290-91 (describing delegation of powers among "household
officials").
24. See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 346-47 (1983) (describing development of mercantile
law).
25. See id. at 346 (discussing "non-professional community tribunals" and dif-
ferent methods of "elections").
26. See id. at 446-47 (discussing expansion to commercial matters). Commer-
cial courts included "courts of markets and fairs, courts of merchant guilds, and
urban courts." Id. at 346 (listing commercial court types). "Various other types of
commercial courts developed" over time, including "courts of the staple" (e.g.,
wool, leather and lead) and local maritime courts. Id. at 347 (describing develop-
ment of commercial courts).
5
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The role of professional jurists as agents of the Crown continued until
1700.27 The King retained the right to appoint the judges of his courts
and to remove them arbitrarily. 28 So tied were the judges to the King that
their tenure ceased at the end of his reign. 29 The Act of Settlement of
1700 "gave the English judiciary tenure 'during good behavior."' 30 Later,
a 1761 statute provided that the death of the King was not to affectjudges'
tenure.
3
In general, the eighteenth century English reforms did not apply to
the American colonies; the King appointed colonialjudges. 32 In reaction,
the Declaration of Independence protested that judges were "dependent
on [the King's] will alone, for the tenure of His offices, and the amount
and payment of their salaries." 33 Thus, the question of the method for
determining judicial selection was one of the matters of disagreement fac-
ing the creators of the federal system. 34 The Drafters of the United States
Constitution did not, however, embrace the idea of an elected judiciary
because of the concern that it would undermine judicial independence. 5
They believed that the judiciary must be free of influence from a monarch
(or executive), as well as from the people judged.3 6
Pennsylvania's process of judicial selection has proceeded through a
number of variations. Its origins trace to the 1681 Charter from King
Charles II to William Penn. 37 The Charter granted to Penn the authority
27. See MARVIN COMISKY & PHILIP C. PATTERSON, THE JUDICIARY-SELECTION,
COMPENSATION, ETHICS, AND DISCIPLINE 3 (1987) (discussing history of.judges who
were "deemed crown agents").
28. See id. (citing Dorothy W. Nelson, Variations on a Therne-Selection and Ten-
ure ofJudges, 36 S. CAL. L. REv. 4, 13-14 (1962) (noting that judges were subject to
"instantaneous and arbitrary removal by the king")).
29. See id. (noting symbiotic relationship between judges and monarch).
30. Id. (identifying legislation passed giving judges greater stability). In addi-
tion, the Act provided that a judge could not be removed absent action by both
houses of Parliament. See id.
31. See id. (citing Nelson, supra note 28, at 13) (explaining elimination of old
practice of disposing ofjudges at time of monarch's death).
32. See id. (noting that reforms did not apply to American colonies).
33. Id. (citing THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 9 (U.S. 1776)). Simi-
larly, the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790 provided for holding office by the jus-
tices of the supreme court during good behavior. See PA. CONST. art. V, § 2
(historical note) (tracing early language to Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790); see
also PA. CONST. art. V, §§ 16-17 (concerning financial matters of judges).
34. For a further discussion of the disagreement facing the creators of the
federal system, see supra note 1 and accompanying text.
35. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 1, at 484 (discussing importance of
judicial independence).
36. See id. at 487 ("This independence of the judges is equally requisite to
guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill
humors.").
37. See Voorhees E. Dunn, Jr., Judicial Reform in Pennsylvania, in JUDICIAL RE-
FORM IN THE STATES 117, 117-20 (Anthony Champagne &Judith Haydel eds., 1993)
(discussing historical background ofjudicial reform in Pennsylvania); see also Chris-
topher Tomlins, The Legal Cartography of Colonization, the Legal Polyphony of Settle-
[Vol. 49: p. I
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to establish a judicial system.3" Penn responded in 1683 with his First
Frame of Government, his proposed first constitution for Pennsylvania,
which provided that judges were to be nominated by the provincial coun-
cil and commissioned by the governor.39 Their tenure was conditioned
on good behavior. 4°1
The ensuing 1701 Frame of Government abolished the provincial
council and placed with the governor the sole authority to choose
judges. 4 1 When Pennsylvania became a state in 1776, its first constitution
established government by an executive council.42 The council, headed
by a president, had the power to appoint judges.43 In the multi-tiered
court system, Pennsylvania Supreme Court justices served seven-year terms
with the possibility of reappointment.44
Pennsylvania rewrote its constitution in 1790 to follow more closely
the federal model, which endorsed the principle of separation of pow-
ers. 4 5 The result was a popularly elected governor with the power to ap-
point supreme court justices to serve during good behavior with the advice
and consent of the legislature. 46 The governor could remove a justice at
the request of two-thirds of the legislature.
4 7
The Jacksonian populist idea of an elected judiciary, based on the
concept that a judge should be accountable to the public, strongly influ-
enced the Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention of 1838.48 A debate on
the issue ofjudicial elections prompted a compromise, which provided for
appointment of supreme court justices by the governor for a fifteen-year
ment: English Intrusions on the American Mainland in the Seventeenth Century, 26 LAw &
Soc. INQUIRY 315, 345 (2001) (tracing roots of Pennsylvania's judicial system);
Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, Pennsylvania State History: The
Quaker Province: 1681-1776, available at http://www.phmc.state.pa.us/bah/pahist/
quaker.asp?secid=31 (last visited Oct. 22, 2003).
38. See Dunn, supra note 37, at 117 (stating Penn had authority to establish
judicial system); Tomlins, supra note 37 at 346 ("[Penn] could make laws . .. and
appoint Judges and Justices, Magistrates and Officers ... for what Causes so
ever.").
39. See Tomlins, supra note 37, at 346-47 (discussing formation of Penn-
sylvania through Penn's efforts); see also Dunn, supra note 37, at 117 (describing
terms of Penn's frame of government).
40. See Dunn, supra note 37, at 117 (noting that tenure was at discretion of
governor).
41. See id. (noting authority to choose judges granted solely to governor).
42. See id. (describing form of government established when Pennsylvania be-
came a state).
43. See id.
44. See id. (describing terms for Pennsylvania Supreme Court justices).
45. See id. (providing basis for Pennsylvania's 1790 Constitution).
46. See id. at 117-18 (describing government under Pennsylvania's 1790
Constitution).
47. See id. at 118 (indicating how legislative vote affected tenure of justices).
48. See id. (discussing Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention of 1838).
2004]
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term, but did not require the "advice and consent" of the legislature. 49
Nevertheless, those favoring popular elections continued to press the is-
sue. In 1850, the constitution was amended to require direct election of
supreme court justices for fifteen-year terms. 50 The 1874 constitution in-
creased the elective term to twenty-one years, but limited justices to one
term.
5 1
.
The resulting partisan elective process required a candidate for the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court to receive a nomination from a political
party and win the primary election in order to qualify for the general elec-
tion. As a result of the Constitutional Convention of 1967-1968, the Judi-
cial Article of the Pennsylvania Constitution was repealed and replaced by
a unified court system.5 2 Today, the system consists of "the Supreme
Court, the Superior Court, the Commonwealth Court, courts of common
pleas, community courts, municipal and traffic courts in the City of Phila-
delphia, [and] such other courts as may be provided by law and justices of
the peace." 5
3
A proposal to the 1967-1968 Constitutional Convention provided for
merit selection and retention of all justices and judges. 54 Its rejection by
the voters in a popular referendum left Pennsylvania with a selection pro-
cess that provides separate regimes for interim and non-interim appoint-
ments. 5 5 A candidate for an initial non-interim seat on the bench runs in
a partisan election for a ten-year term.5 6 If a justice or judge sitting by
virtue of victory in a partisan election wishes to remain for another term,
the justice or judge runs unopposed in a retention election. 57 Histori-
cally, most justices and judges win their retention elections in
Pennsylvania.
58
49. See id. (noting debate between Whigs and Democrats over judicial
tenure).
50. See id. (discussing changes to judicial terms).
51. See id.
52. See id. at 119 (discussing implementation of today's system).
53. PA. CONST. art. V, § 1. Pursuant to the 1968 Amendments to the Constitu-
tion of Pennsylvania, effective 1970, the Commonwealth Court was created. See PA.
CONST. art. V, § 4. Although judges are currently elected in partisan elections, the
governor initially appointed the first contingent of Commonwealth Court judges.
54. See Dunn, supra note 37, at 119 (discussing further proposed changes of
Constitutional Convention).
55. See id. at 119-20 (discussing system of partisan election).
56. See PA. CONST. art. V, § 13(a) (describing process); id. § 15(a) (defining
tenure). Primary cross-filing, once permitted in all courts, is now permitted only
in the courts of common pleas. Cross-filing allows a candidate to receive the nomi-
nation of both parties and thereby run unopposed in the general election. See
generally Appendix.
57. See PA. CONsT. art. V, § 15(b) (defining means by which justices may serve
multiple terms).
58. See Jonathan P. Nase, Why Judges Leave the Bench: Pennsylvania 1978-1993,
68 TEMP. L. REv. 739, 744 (1995) (reporting study results betweenJanuary 1, 1978
and September 15, 1993, which indicated 3.3% rate of loss).
[Vol. 49: p. I
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When a judicial vacancy occurs, the governor, with the advice and
consent of two-thirds of the Senate, appoints an individual to fill the in-
terim vacancy for the remainder of the unserved term.5 9 The appointee
serves the shorter of either the remainder of the unexpired term or the
time until the next municipal election occurring more than ten months
after the vacancy. 61 If the appointed justice or judge wishes to remain on
the bench at the end of the interim appointive term, the justice or judge
must run in a partisan election rather than in a retention election. 6 Be-
cause judicial vacancies routinely occur, the appointment process is fre-
quently employed, and it is thought that appointment gives the incumbent
an advantage over rivals in the ensuing partisan election.6 2
III. METHODS OF JUDICIAL SELECTION
In general, the states use two methods to select judges: appointment
and election. 63 Throughout its history, Pennsylvania has dabbled with va-
rious forms of both methods.
A. Appointment
As the foregoing summary indicates, appointment is the oldest of the
methods of judicial selection. The majority of states today, however, do
not use appointment for the initial selection of justices and judges.
In an apparent reaction to the colonial practice, the original thirteen
states were reluctant to put the power to select the judiciary into the hands
of one person. At the same time, however, the idea of popular election of
judges and forms of appointment were not yet widely considered viable
alternatives. Accordingly, eight of the original states chose to select jus-
tices and judges through appointment by the legislature, and the remain-
ing five gave the governor appointment power subject to the approval of
the legislature.64
To balance the seemingly competing considerations of independence
and accountability, proponents of appointment argue that judicial inde-
59. See PA. CONST. art. V, § 13(b).
60. See id.
61. See Nase, supra note 58, at 741 (describing method by which appointed
judge may serve subsequent term).
62. See id. at 751 n.57 (discussing low rate of loss in retention elections).
63. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. VI, §§ 2, 4 (illustrating use of two methods). Ap-
pointment and election are the widely recognized categories of judicial selection.
There are, however, many variations of these broad categories. Some states may
use one method to select appellate judges and another to select trial judges. For
example, in New York, court of appeals judges are appointed through a nominat-
ing commission and supreme court (trial division) justices are selected in partisan
elections. See id. Supreme court (appellate division) justices are appointed from
among the justices of the supreme court (trial division). See id.
64. See Peter D. Webster, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is There One "Best"
Method?, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 13 (1995) (discussing selection ofjudges in origi-
nal states).
2004]
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pendence should come first. Further, proponents believe that the ap-
pointment process, rather than the election process, allows a more
rational and informed determination of the qualifications needed to select
a justice or judge capable of making an informed and legally supportable
decision. They view the absence of periodic accountability to the electo-
rate as a positive feature. They contend that, by the inherent nature of the
public election process, voters are not, and cannot be, sufficiently in-
formed about the qualities of a justice or judge necessary to the proper
and efficient functioning of the legal system.65
Proponents of appointment assert that the appointment process
achieves an adequate quantum of accountability because the appointing
authority is responsible for its actions in selecting the candidates it
designates to the bench. A justice or judge not capable of making an in-
formed and legally supportable decision impairs not only the particular
justice or judge, but also those who favored the selection of the justice or
judge. Proponents of appointment contend, however, that the appointing
authority is in a better position to take direct curative action than is the
voting public, which is likely to lack the information and the expertise of
the appointing authority. Finally, there are arguments that the appoint-
ment ofjustices and judges increases the probability that qualified minori-
ties and women will be selected. 66
Most states that use gubernatorial appointment as the method of ini-
tial selection temper the chief executive's choice with an approval mecha-
nism: requiring confirmation and approval by either the legislature or an
executive council. 67 For example, Vermont requires that the appoint-
ment of appellate court justices and judges be subject to legislative confir-
mation, 68 and NewJersey requires that the governor obtain the advice and
consent of the Senate before making judicial appointments. 69 New
Hampshire provides that an executive council must approve the gover-
nor's judicial appointments. 70
As mentioned above, a majority of the original thirteen states used a
legislative appointment method of judicial selection. Currently, in Vir-
ginia, for example, both houses of the legislature participate in the selec-
tion process, which requires a separate majority vote of each house.7 1
65. See Ellen Mattleman Kaplan, Pennsylvanians for Modern Courts, Blueprint
of the Future ofJudicial Selection Reform, § 1.B, para. 9 (July 1999), available at http://
www.pmconline.org/blue/blueMain.htm.
66. See Webster, supra note 64, at 14 (mentioning appointive method's possi-
ble benefits for minorities).
67. See COMISKY & PAtrERSON, supra note 27, at 6 (discussing legislative veto
power in appointment process).
68. See VT. CONST. ch. II, § 32.
69. See N.J. CONsT. art. 6, § 6, 1.
70. See N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 46.
71. See CoMrsmv & PArTERSON, supra note 27, at 5 (discussing legislative ap-
pointment ofjudges). Also, in Rhode Island and South Carolina, an appointment
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Critics of legislative appointment maintain that few legislators are
qualified to decide the criteria for and initial qualifications of a justice or
judge. They also believe that legislators are too politically motivated and
that justices and judges may feel obligated to those legislators who were
instrumental in their appointment to the bench. Additionally, present or
former legislators who seek appointment to the bench may receive more
favor from their former political colleagues than their opponents may
receive. 72
The new wave of appointment is merit selection, called the "Missouri
Plan" for the first state that introduced it. In general, a special commis-
sion identifies the criteria that the state seeks in its justices andjudges, and
then the commission selects acceptable candidates. 73 The slate of accept-
able candidates is submitted to the state appointing authority, which de-
cides on the judge.74
Merit selection moved to the forefront in 1937, when the American
Bar Association (ABA) endorsed it as the preferred method of judicial
selection. 75 In its prototypical form, the process requires a nonpartisan
commission composed of lawyers and non-lawyers who actively identify,
recruit and screen candidates for judicial vacancies. The commission pro-
vides a list of acceptable candidates (usually three) to the governor, who
must select from the list to fill the vacancy. After an initial term of years,
the justice orjudge can run in a retention election, in which the voters are
simply asked whether they wish to retain the justice or judge.
Proponents of the merit selection process insist that it is the most
effective way to solve the primary problems of judicial selection: voter ig-
norance and apathy.7 6 Proponents of merit selection say that those factors
result in a less-qualified judiciary.
The system presupposes a selection commission that itself is highly
qualified to identify the characteristics sought for in justices and judges
and thereby select the individuals who will make the best justices and
judges. Supporters of the Missouri Plan reason that merit selection in-
creases the pool of qualified candidates by eliminating the pressures and
must be approved by a joint vote of both houses. In Virginia, a separate majority
vote of each house suffices.
72. See id. (discussing advantages of legislative appointment system).
73. SeeJames E. Lozier, Judicial Selection: The Missouri Plan A/K/A Merit Selec-
tion: Is It the Best Solution for Selecting Michigan's Judges?, 75 MicHi. B.J. 918, 920
(1996) (providing overview of merit selection system).
74. See id.
75. See CoMisKv & PATTERSON, supra note 27, at 5 (discussing initial endorse-
ments of merit selection).
76. See Bridget E. Montgomery & Christopher C. Connor, Partisan Elections:
The Albatross of Pennsylvania's Appellate Judiciary, 98 DICK. L. REV. 1, 18 (1993) (relat-
ing survey results showing that ninety percent of Pennsylvania voters admit to
spending "little or no time learning about the background and qualifications of
judicial candidates for Pennsylvania appellate courts").
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vagaries of the elective process that would otherwise discourage compe-
tent candidates from pursuing a position on the bench.7 7
Opponents of this method focus on whether justices and judges cho-
sen via a merit selection process are representative of or accountable to
the populace. 78 They argue that the selection commissions often are not
representative of the public and that the candidate pool may not ade-
quately represent all segments of the community. Further, its critics do
not see merit selection as an effective compromise on accountability. A
subsequent retention election is deemed an inadequate solution because
the incumbents rarely lose. Some see merit selection as an elitist system
that replaces the popular will with the will of a few individuals. Addition-
ally, opponents of merit selection contend that it is not as apolitical as it
appears. A governor may choose commission members who share the gov-
ernor's party affiliation or social views and who may thereby be politically
biased.79
Currently, twenty-nine jurisdictions use some variation of the merit
selection method of appointment."(' Ten states combine merit selection
with the election ofjudges.8 ' In eight of the jurisdictions with merit selec-
tion, the judges are reappointed in a manner similar to the way they were
77. See Pennsylvanians for Modern Courts, Merit Selection-The Supreme Choice
for Pennsylvania: What Pennsylvanians Need to Know About Choosing Judges, available at
http://wwv.pmconline.org/archive/meritbro.shtml (last modified Mar. 1994)
(championing benefits of merit selection); see also Lozier, supra note 73, at 921
(describing disadvantages inherent in elective process that deter well-qualified can-
didates from seeking judicial positions).
78. See, e.g., Montgomery & Connor, supra note 76, at 16-17 (detailing argu-
ments against merit selection).
79. See Lozier, supra note 73, at 922 (discussing criticisms of Missouri Plan); see
also Martin Scott Driggers, Jr., South Carolina's Experiment: Legislative Control ofJudi-
cial Merit Selection, 49 S.C. L. REv. 1217, 1226 (1998) ("A recent study revealed that
commissioners, on the whole, remain overwhelmingly white, largely over 40 years
of age and reflective of both an educational and occupational elite. Judicial com-
missioners also typically evidence high levels of political and civic involvement.
Some cry that this results in judicial selection commissions that reflect the elite of
society. With such a concentration of similar characteristics combined in a politi-
cally active group of individuals, political influence appears as a potential threat to
the merit selection system." (internal quotations and citations omitted));Judith L.
Maute, Selecting Justice in State Courts: The Ballot Box or the Backroom?, 41 S. TEX. L.
REv. 1197, 1235 (2000) ("About one third of lawyer and non-lawyer commissioners
have had high levels of political or civic activity, having served in partisan or public
offices. This evidence raises a 'troubling spectre of political favoritism' that could
call into question the legitimacy of merit selection systems." (citations omitted)).
80. Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Is-
land, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia and Wyo-
ming. See Appendix.
81. Arizona, California, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, New
York, South Dakota and Tennessee. See Appendix.
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appointed originally.8 2 In three states that use merit selection, judges are
appointed for life during good behavior.83
B. Election
1. In General
The majority of state court justices and judges in this country are
elected, and these elected justices andjudges write most of our opinions. 84
Indeed, thirty-two states select at least some of their justices and judges in
partisan and nonpartisan elections. 85 Specifically, Alabama, Illinois, Loui-
siana, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Texas and West Virginia select all of
their justices and judges in partisan elections.8 6 Additionally, the follow-
ing states select all of their justices and judges in nonpartisan elections:
Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Ne-
vada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Washington and Wis-
consin.87 Mississippi elects all justices and judges, some through partisan
elections and others in nonpartisan elections. 8 3 In ten other states, some
justices and judges are elected.89 Of the nineteen jurisdictions (including
the District of Columbia) that select their justices and judges without elec-
tions, 90 nine (Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Iowa, Nebraska, Oklahoma,
Utah, Vermont and Wyoming) require justices and judges to run in reten-
tion elections, sometimes as soon as a year after their original appoint-
ments, to retain their positions. 9 1 Thus, elections play a role in more than
eighty percent (80%) of jurisdictions.
Advocates of the elective process weigh the accountability factor more
heavily than considerations of judicial independence. They assert that
qualified justices and judges inevitably survive the process while unquali-
fied justices and judges do not. Proponents believe in the right of the
people to vote for those who will judge them. They argue that because a
justice's or judge's decisions on public policy issues influence the law, jus-
tices and judges should be held accountable to the people who are directly
82. Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Maine, New Jersey, New York
(Court of Appeals), South Carolina, Virginia. See Appendix.
83. Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Rhode Island. See Appendix.
84. Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule
of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV'. 689, 690 (1995) (discussing preponderance of court
opinions written by elected judges).
85. See Appendix.
86. See Appendix.
87. See Appendix.
88. See Appendix.
89. Arizona, California, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, New
York, South Dakota and Tennessee. See Appendix.
90. Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii,
Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oklahoma,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont, Virginia and Wyoming. See
Appendix.
91. See Appendix.
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affected by those decisions, just as the executive and the legislative bodies
are held accountable to the electorate through the elective process.
9 2
Opponents ofjudicial elections believe that it is more important that
the judiciary be independent than accountable to the electorate. Some
insist that judicial elections go so far as to violate due process by making
fair and impartial adjudication difficult, if not impossible, because elected
justices and judges are unable to be completely neutral. 93
2. Partisan Elections
Fourteen states utilize partisan elections to elect at least some of their
justices and judges.9 4 Seven of those jurisdictions use partisan elections as
the sole method of selecting justices and judges for all courts. 95 To serve
additional terms in those states,justices and judges must be re-elected 96 or
retained.
9 7
The 1909 Amendments to the Pennsylvania Constitution provided,
for the first time, for the election of all justices and judges at general elec-
tions, in the same manner as the election of legislators. 98 The change was
apparently based on the theory that the inclusion of the judiciary in gen-
eral elections encouraged votes along party lines. As a result, general elec-
tions in Pennsylvania are held in even-numbered years,99 and judicial
elections are held in odd-numbered years.10 0
Those who believe in partisan elections assert that more candidates
are eligible to participate in the process because it is an open method of
selection. Further, the identification of a candidate's party gives the voters
an idea of the candidate's ideology.'0 1 On the other hand, opponents of
partisan elections cite a myriad of reasons for concern. Philosophically,
92. SeeJudge Laurence H. Silberman, Circuit Judge, United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, Federalist Society Symposium: Washington,
D.C.: Nov. 14-16, 1996, Panel Five: Term Limits for Judges ?, 13 J.L. & POL. 669, 684
(1997) ("The more judges are engaged in policymaking, as a matter of political
theory, the more they should be accountable through elections.").
93. See, e.g., Scott D. Wiener, Note, Popular Justice: State Judicial Elections and
Procedural Due Process, 31 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 187, 189 (1996) (arguing that
public election of judges creates "substantial . . . risk to fair and impartial
adjudication").
94. Alabama, Arizona, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Mis-
souri, New Mexico, New York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas and West Virginia.
See Appendix.
95. Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Texas and West
Virginia use partisan elections for all courts and re-elect judges at the end of their
terms. See Appendix.
96. Alabama, Louisiana, Texas and West Virginia. See Appendix.
97. Illinois, New Mexico and Pennsylvania. See Appendix.
98. See PA. CONST. art. V, § 13(a).
99. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2602(h) (West 2003).
100. See PA. CONST. art VII, §§ 2-3.
101. See COMISKy & PATrERSON, supra note 27, at 8 (listing arguments against
partisan elections).
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they tend to believe that judicial independence trumps accountability and
that the elective system is not an effective method of ensuring accountabil-
ity because voters are apathetic and uninformed about judicial elec-
tions. 1°2 Additionally, they contend that voters are not sufficiently
competent to evaluate a candidate's qualifications. Voters are said to be
influenced by factors having nothing to do with a candidate's ability to
perform the duties of a qualified justice or judge, such as: party affiliation,
name recognition, geographical location and ethnicity. The politics of
partisan election creates opposition to a candidate based on party affilia-
tion, rather than on qualities that will make him or her a justice or judge
capable of making an informed, reasoned and legally supportable deci-
sion. 10 3 Further, critics maintain that party leaders, who are either unable
or unwilling to determine the qualifications of a competent justice or
judge, select the judicial nominees for the party. Critics fear that justices
and judges will feel obligated to the political leaders who select them and
to those who contribute to their campaign funds. Finally, it is argued that
the stress of campaigning, eliciting support and raising funds, deter many
otherwise qualified candidates. 104
Critics of partisan elections also posit that the interim appointment
process neutralizes the accountability benefits of the election method.
They contend that because most justices and judges begin their judicial
careers through interim appointments, the ensuing partisan election is a
hollow one. The sitting candidate is virtually assured the party nomina-
tion, in both the primary and general elections, and has the benefit of a
record of accomplishment to use to defeat any opponent. 10 5
3. Nonpartisan Elections
Nonpartisan elections became prevalent in the middle of the last cen-
tury. They began in part because of suspicions and concerns about the
integrity of partisan elections, such as the belief that political machines
selected judicial candidates and subsequently controlled elected justices
and judges. 10 6
The principal argument in support of nonpartisan elections is that
they remove the undesirable political element from judicial selection,
while retaining the predominant element of accountability. 10 7 Because
102. See Maute, supra note 79, at 1221.
103. See, e.g., Thomas E. Brennan, Judicial Selection: What Fits Texas?: Nonparti-
san Election of Judges: The Michigan Case, 40 Sw. L.J. 23, 24 (1986) (Special Issue)
(analyzing Michigan's judicial election system).
104. See Montgomery & Connor, supra note 76, at 15-16 (detailing benefits of
merit selection).
105. See Kaplan, supra note 65, at 8-13 (arguing for judicial reform).
106. See Webster, supra note 64, at 24-25 (discussing causes for creation of
nonpartisan elections).
107. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 103, at 23-24 (comparing effect of partisan
versus nonpartisan election of Michigan judges).
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party affiliation is not before the electorate, justices and judges are more
likely to be chosen because of their professional and personal qualifica-
tions, which are not tainted or screened from view by the distraction of
partisan factionalism. 10 8 Those favoring nonpartisan elections assert that
"[p]artisanship is a notion clearly at odds with impartiality, and impartial-
ity is the goal of the judiciary [and that there] is no place for party disci-
pline or party loyalty in the courts."' 9
IV. COMMENTARY
Competing concerns of democracy and constitutionalism underlie
the philosophical issue of whetherjustices and judges should be elected or
appointed. In a democracy, the consent of the governed legitimizes politi-
cal authority and power. Further, the legitimacy of decision-makers be-
comes more tenuous as the procedure for their selection becomes more
distant from the people their decisions affect. In our constitutional de-
mocracy, however, the will of the majority is not absolute; it is limited by
the concept of constitutionalism, which tempers the will of the majority by
protecting the rights of individuals. Constitutionalism is, at base, protec-
tion against the consequences of majoritarian power:
Constitutionalism thus seeks to limit the scope of democratic
power, to circumscribe majoritarianism. Over certain spheres,
the majority possesses no immediate control. These spheres are
designated as "rights," and the individual is said to "possess"
these rights "against" the majority, which is to say, against en-
croachment by majoritarian power.
."Majoritarian authority is limited by the constitutional
rights individuals hold against the majority, such that policies
supported by a majority that contravene those rights, substan-
tively or procedurally, are for that reason without force." Consti-
tutions embody this principle of constitutionalism by providing
certain checks on majoritarian decisions. Majoritarian decisions
are subject to review to ensure their compatibility with constitu-
tionally protected rights. 110
While the concept of democracy supports the selection ofjustices and
judges by election, the need to protect individual rights, or constitutional-
ism, causes us to question whether the majority can successfully choose
justices and judges willing to protect individual rights when the rights of
the individual are inconsistent with the will of the majority. This
108. See Webster, supra note 64, at 25. In a nonpartisan election system, goodjudges are generally unopposed.
109. Brennan, supra note 103, at 23-24.
110. Croley, supra note 84, at 704-05 (internal citations and formatting
omitted).
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majoritarian problem thus raises the question: How can elected justices
and judges be acceptable in a society dedicated to constitutionalism?II l
There is a more significant question, though: How effective are the
elected judiciaries in protecting constitutional rights? If elected justices
and judges are protecting individual rights as well as, or more successfully
than, appointed justices and judges, then constitutionalism may not be a
basis for favoring the selection ofjustices andjudges by appointment. The
theoretical argument that justices and judges elected by "the majority" do
not protect constitutionally preserved rights as well as appointed justices
and judges do is well taken. There is little data supporting that proposi-
tion, however, whereas there is a great deal of anecdotal evidence that
elected justices and judges are able to protect constitutional rights not-
withstanding that their actions may not be popular.'12
V. CONCLUSION
Contrary to the concerns of some, it may be that the process of requir-
ing someone to campaign for a judicial position helps to foster the place-
ment of individuals of integrity into the role of justice or judge. Perhaps
the campaign process, which requires candidates for judicial office to talk
with thousands of people from diverse walks of life and, in Pennsylvania,
travel through unknown territory in a state with sixty-seven counties, gives
judicial candidates a broader perspective from which to consider the issues
they will face as judicial officers. The point is that if those concerned with
constitutionalism fear the willingness of state-elected judiciaries to protect
individual rights, they should first demonstrate that the elected officials
are failing to protect those rights. To date, the authors do not believe that
such a showing has been made and, at least anecdotally, it appears that
elected justices and judges are doing as good a job as appointed ones in
safeguarding individual rights.
111. See id.
112. The other confounding principle is that the majority of people in this
country favor the protection of individual rights. Accordingly, even if one were to
accept, for purposes of discussion, the argument that elected judges are beholden
to the majority, if the majority favors the protection of individual rights, constitu-
tionalism need not fear the current majority.
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APPENDIX
SUMMARY OF STATE COURT JUDICIAL SELECTION
IN THE UNITED STATES
ALABAMA
* Court Structure
Supreme Court; Court of Civil Appeals (intermediate court of appeals);
Court of Criminal Appeals (intermediate court of appeals); Circuit
Court (trial court).
" Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
"All [justices and] judges shall be elected by vote of the electors within
the territorial jurisdiction of their respective courts."' 13 "The term of
office of each [ustice or] judge of a court of the judicial system of this
state shall be six years." 114 The elections are partisan elections." 5
" Method and Term of Retention
To remain in office, ajustice orjudge must be re-elected 116 in the same
manner in which the justice or judge was elected originally. The length
of subsequent terms equals the length of the original term.
" Mandatory Retirement Age
A justice or judge cannot be elected once the justice or judge has at-
tained the age of seventy years. 117 A justice or judge who reaches sev-
enty during the course of a term may serve the remainder of the term.
* Cross-Filing118
There is no cross-filing in Alabama.1 19
ALASKA
" Court Structure
Supreme Court; Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court); Supe-
rior Court (trial court).
" Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
The governor appoints justices on the supreme court and judges on the
court of appeals and superior court from a list of two or more names
provided by a judicial council. 120
113. ALA. CONST. art. VI, § 6.13.
114. ALA. CONST. art. VI, § 6.15.
115. See ALA. CODE § 17-7-1 (2003).
116. Unless otherwise indicated, judges may run for an unlimited number of
terms until they reach an applicable mandatory retirement age.
117. See ALA. CONST. art. VI, § 6.16.
118. Cross-filing allows a candidate to receive the nomination of both parties
and thereby run unopposed in the general election.
119. See ALA. CODE § 17-7-1.
120. See ALAsKA CONST. art. IV, §5; ALASKA STAT. §§ 22.05.080, 22.07.070,
22.10.100 (Michie 2003).
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The judicial council shall consist of seven members. Three at-
torney members shall be appointed for six-year terms by the
governing body of the organized state bar. Three non-attorney
members shall be appointed for six-year terms by the Governor
subject to confirmation by a majority of the members of the
legislature in joint session.... The chiefjustice of the supreme
court shall be ex-officio the seventh member and chairman of
the judicial council.1 2 1
The initial term of office for all justices and judges is three years.
" Method and Term of Retention
Retention elections are held at the first general election more than
three years after the justice or judge is appointed. After the first reten-
tion election, supreme court justices must run in retention elections
every ten years, judges on the court of appeals run for retention every
eight years and judges on the superior court run for retention every six
years. 122
• Mandatory Retirement Age
At the age of seventy, justices and judges must retire. 23
" Cross-Filing
Cross-filing is not a consideration in Alaska because initial selection is by
the governor through a nominating commission.
ARIZONA
" Court Structure
Supreme Court; Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court); Supe-
rior Court (trial court).
" Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
The governor selects from those nominated by a judicial nominating
commission and appoints justices for the supreme court, and judges for
the court of appeals and the superior court in the state's two largest
counties.
There shall be a non-partisan commission on appellate court
appointments which shall be composed of the chief justice of
the supreme court . . . five attorney members, who shall be
nominated by the board of Governors of the state bar of Ari-
zona and appointed by the Governor with the advice and con-
sent of the senate ... and ten nonattorney members who shall
be appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of
the senate .... 124
121. ALAsKA CONST. art. IV, § 8.
122. See ALAsKA CONST. art. IV, § 6; http://www.state.ak.us/courts/ctinfo.htm
(last visited Mar. 18, 2003).
123. See ALAsKA STAT. § 22.25.010.
124. Aiuz. CONST. art. VI, §§ 36, 37.
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The initial term in office ends sixty days after the end of the year in
which a two-year term expires. 125 Judges of the superior court in
smaller counties are elected in partisan elections and serve for four-year
ters.
12 6
* Method and Term of Retention
Retention elections are held at the expiration of the initial terms of all
justices andjudges who are selected via the judicial nominating commis-
sion. 12 7 They serve six-year terms. Judges of the superior court in
smaller counties must be re-elected in partisan elections for additional
four-year terms.
" Mandatory Retirement Age
Justices and judges must retire when they reach the age of seventy. 1 28
" Cross-Filing
Cross-filing is not a consideration in Arizona for appellate courts and
the superior court in large counties because initial selection is by the
governor through ajudicial nominating commission. Cross-filing is not
permitted in the counties that have partisan elections.
ARKANSAS
" Court Structure
Supreme Court; Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court); Cir-
cuit Court (trial court).
" Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
Supreme court justices and court of appeals judges serve eight-year
terms. Circuit court judges serve six-year terms.1 2 9 Supreme courtjus-
tices and court of appeals and circuit court judges are selected in non-
partisan elections.1 30
" Method and Term of Retention
To serve additional terms of the same duration, justices and judges must
be re-elected in nonpartisan elections. 3 1
" Mandatory Retirement Age
Generally, justices and judges must retire by age seventy or lose retire-
ment benefits.' 3 2
" Cross-Filing
Cross-filing is not a consideration in Arkansas because elections are
nonpartisan.
125. See id. art. VI, § 37(C).
126. See id. art. VI, §§ 12, 41.
127. See id. art. VI, § 38.
128. See id. art. VI, § 9.
129. See id. amend. 80, § 16.
130. See id. amend. 80, §§ 17, 18.
131. See id.
132. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 24-8-215 (Michie 2003).
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CALIFORNIA
" Court Structure
Supreme Court; Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court); Supe-
rior Court (trial court),."'
" Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
Justices of the supreme court are elected at large.1 3 4 Justices of the
courts of appeals are elected at general elections in their districts.
13 5
Judges of the superior courts are elected at general elections in their
counties. 136 Supreme court and courts of appeals justices serve twelve-
year terms and superior court judges serve six-year terms.1 3 7
" Method and Term of Retention
The governor usually fills vacancies in the courts by appointment. 138 At
the appellate level, if a justice is appointed to a vacancy, the justice
serves until the first general election after appointment. 13 9 At that gen-
eral election, the name of the appointed justice goes on the ballot for
confirmation for the remainder of the term.140 In each case, the justice
must be elected in a retention election. Judges on the superior court
must be re-elected (but almost no one ever opposes them). If the elec-
tions are unopposed, then the legislature may provide that the name of
the judge does not have to appear on the ballot.141
" Mandatry Retirement Age
There is no mandatory retirement age.
" Cross-Filing
Because California appears to have elections, it is not clear whether
"cross-filing" is a consideration for California.
COLORADO
* Court Structure
Supreme Court; Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court); Dis-
trict Court (trial court).
" Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
Justices of the supreme court and judges of the court of appeals and
district court are nominated by a judicial nominating commission and
appointed by the governor for an initial term of two years. The judicial
133. In California, all jurists serving on appellate courts are called "justices."
134. See CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 16(a).
135. See id.
136. See id. § 16(b). Under certain circumstances, general elections will not
be appropriate because the requirements of federal law will not be met. In those
cases, the legislature will provide for the election of superior court judges. See id.
§ 16(b), (d).
137. See id. § 16(a), (c).
138. See id. § 16(d) (2).
139. See id.
140. See id. § 16(d)(1).
141. See id. § 16(b).
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nominating commission consists of four governor-appointed non-attor-
ney members, three governor-appointed attorney members, the chief
justice of the supreme court and the attorney general. Political parties
are barred from having a majority of more than one on the
commission.142
" Method and Term of Retention
At the expiration of their initial terms, justices and judges must run in
retention elections to be entitled to serve subsequent full terms. Jus-
tices on the supreme court serve ten-year terms. Judges on the court of
appeals serve eight-year terms and judges on the district court serve six-
year terms.
" Mandatory Retirement Age
Justices and judges must retire at the age of seventy-two. 143
" Cross-Filing
Cross-filing is not a consideration in Colorado because justices and
judges are appointed.
CONNECTICUT
" Court Structure
Supreme Court; Appellate Court (intermediate appellate court); Supe-
rior Court (trial court).
* Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
Justices of the supreme court and judges of the appellate court and su-
perior court are "nominated by the Governor exclusively from candi-
dates submitted by the judicial selection commission." 144 They serve
eight-year terms.145
There is established a Judicial Selection Commission com-
prised of twelve members. Two persons shall be appointed
from each congressional district, one of whom shall be an at-
torney-at-law and one of whom shall not be an attorney-at-law.
Not more than six of the members shall belong to the same
political party.146
* Method and Term of Retention
Ajudicial selection commission reviews justices and judges who wish to
be retained. The commission makes recommendations to the governor
regarding whether the judge should be reappointed.' 47
" Mandatory Retirement Age
Justices and judges must retire at the age of seventy. 148
142. See CoLo. CONST. art. VI, § 24(3).
143. See id. § 23(1).
144. CONN. CONST. art. 5, § 2.
145. See id.
146. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-44a(a) (2003).
147. See id. § 51-44a(e).
148. See CONN. CONST. art. 5, § 6.
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* Cross-Filing
Cross-filing is not a consideration in Connecticut because justices and
judges are appointed.
DELAWARE
" Court Structure
Supreme Court; Court of Chancery (specialty court of equity); Superior
Court (trial court). Delaware does not have an intermediate appellate
court.
" Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
The governor, with the consent of the state Senate, appoints justices of
the supreme court and judges of the court of chancery and superior
court for twelve-year terms.1 49
" Method and Term of Retention
An incumbent justice or judge must be reappointed to serve additional
terms. 1
50
" Mandatory Retirement Age
There is no mandatory retirement age.
" Cross-Filing
Cross-filing is not a consideration in Delaware because justices and
judges are appointed.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
• Court Structure
Court of Appeals; Superior Court (trial court). The District of Colum-
bia does not have an intermediate appellate court. 15'
" Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
The President of the United States nominates judges "from the list of
persons recommended by the District of Columbia Judicial Nomination
Commission ... and with the advice and consent of the Senate, ap-
point[s] all judges of the District of Columbia courts."152 District of
Columbia judges serve fifteen-year terms. 153
[The seven m]embers of the [District of Columbia Judicial
Nomination] Commission shall be appointed as follows: (A)
One member shall be appointed by the President of the
United States. (B) Two members shall be appointed by the
Board of Governors of the unified District of Columbia Bar,
both of whom shall have been engaged in the practice of law in
the District for at least five successive years preceding their ap-
149. See DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
150. See id.
151. In the District of Columbia, all jurists are called 'judges."
152. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-204.33(a) (2003).
153. See id. § 11-1502.
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pointment. (C) Two members shall be appointed by the
Mayor, one of whom shall not be a lawyer. (D) One member
shall be appointed by the Council, and shall not be a lawyer.
(E) One member shall be appointed by the chief judge of the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, and
such member shall be an active or retired Federal judge serv-
ing in the District.' 54
* Method and Term of Retention
Not less than six months prior to the expiration of the judge's
term of office, any judge of the District of Columbia courts
may file with the Tenure Commission a declaration of candi-
dacy for reappointment. . . . If a declaration is so filed, the
Tenure Commission shall ... prepare and submit to the Presi-
dent a written evaluation of the declaring candidate's perform-
ance during the present term of office and the candidate's
fitness for reappointment to another term. If the Tenure
Commission determines the declaring candidate to be well
qualified for reappointment to another term, then the term of
such declaring candidate shall be automatically extended for
another full term, subject to mandatory retirement, suspen-
sion, or removal. If the Tenure Commission determines the
declaring candidate to be qualified for reappointment to an-
other term, then the President may nominate such candidate,
in which case the President shall submit to the Senate for ad-
vice and consent the renomination of the declaring candidate
as judge. 155
* Mandatory Retirement Age
The mandatory retirement age is seventy-four. 15 6
* Cross-Filing
Cross-filing is not a consideration in the District of Columbia because
judges are appointed.
FLORIDA
" Court Structure
Supreme Court; District Court of Appeal (intermediate appellate
court); Circuit Court (trial court).
* Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
The governor selects justices for the supreme court and judges for the
district court of appeal from a list "of not fewer than three persons nor
more than six persons nominated by the appropriate judicial nominat-
154. Id. § 1-204.34(b) (4).
155. Id. § 1-204.33(c).
156. See id. § 11-1502.
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ing commission."' 15 7 Justices on the supreme court and judges on the
district court of appeal serve six-year terms. 153 "Circuit court judges are
elected by the voters of the circuits in non-partisan, contested elections
against other persons who choose to qualify as candidates for the posi-
tion. Circuit court judges serve for six-year terms."159
" Method and Term of Retention
Justices on the supreme court and judges on the district court of appeal
can "qualify for retention by a vote of the electors in the general elec-
tion next preceding the expiration of the justice's or judge's term
.... -160 Circuit court judges must be re-elected to the office in the
same manner in which they were originally elected. The length of sub-
sequent terms equals the length of the original term.
" Mandatory Retirement Age
Justices and judges must retire at the age of seventy. 16 1 A justice or
judge may, however, serve the remainder of the term if the justice or
judge has completed one-half of the term upon reaching the age of
seventy.162
" Cross-Filing
Cross-filing is not a consideration in Florida because justices and judges
are appointed or selected in nonpartisan elections.
GEORGIA
" Court Structure
Supreme Court; Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court); Supe-
rior Court (trial court).
" Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
All supreme court justices and court of appeals judges are elected on a
nonpartisan basis for six-year terms; superior court judges are selected
through nonpartisan election for terms of four years. 163
* Method and Term of Retention
To remain in office, ajustice or judge must be re-elected to the office in
the same manner in which the justice or judge was elected originally.
The length of subsequent terms equals the length of the original term.
" Mandatory Retirement Age
[I]n consideration of the payment of [retirement] benefits
.... [an] appellate court judge shall resign from office as an
157. FLA. CONsT. art. V, § 11.
158. See id. § 10(a).
159. Florida Center for Interactive Media, Florida-History, People and Politics:
Unit 4: Florida Today: Judicial Branch, available at http://www.fcim.org/flhistory/
unit4_t3.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2003); see also FLA. CONST. art. V, § 10(a).
160. F[LA. CONST. art. V, § 10(a).
161. See id. § 8.
162. See id.
163. See GA. CONST. art. VI, § 7, 1.
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appellate court judge on or before the day upon which he or
she attains 75 years of age or on the last day of the term in
which such appellate court judge is serving when he or she
attains age 70, whichever is later.164
* Cross-Filing
Cross-filing is not a consideration in Georgia because elections are
nonpartisan.
HAWA I
" Court Structure
Supreme Court; Intermediate Court of Appeals; Circuit Court (trial
court).
" Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
The governor fills a vacancy on any court by appointing a person from a
list of four to six candidates nominated by a judicial selection commis-
sion. 165 The judicial selection commission consists of nine members-
two appointed by the governor, two appointed by the speaker of the
state House of Representatives, two appointed by the president of the
state Senate, one appointed by the chief justice of the supreme court
and two elected by the members in good standing of the state bar.' 66
No more than four members of the commission may be attorneys. 167
The term of office for all justices and judges is ten years. 168
" Method and Term of Retention
At least six months prior to the expiration of a justice's or
judge's term of office, everyjustice and judge shall petition the
judicial selection commission to be retained in office or shall
inform the commission of an intention to retire. If the judicial
selection commission determines that the justice or judge
should be retained in office, the commission shall renew the
term of office of such justice or judge .... 169
" Mandatory Retirement Age
All justices and judges must retire at age seventy. 170
" Cross-Filing
Cross-filing is not a consideration in Hawaii because initial selection is
through a nominating commission.
164. GA. CODE ANN. § 47-2-244(c) (2002).
165. See HAW. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
166. See id. § 4.
167. See id.
168. See id. § 3.
169. Id.
170. See id.
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IDAHO
" Court Structure
Supreme Court; Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court); Dis-
trict Court (trial court).
" Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
Supreme court justices and court of appeals judges are elected in non-
partisan elections and serve six-year terms. 17 1 District court judges are
also elected in nonpartisan elections and serve four-year terms.
172
* Method and Term of Retention
To remain in office, a justice or judge must be re-elected to the office in
the same manner in which the justice or judge was elected originally.
The length of subsequent terms equals the length of the original term.
" Mandatory Retirement Age
There is no mandatory retirement age for justices and judges.
" Cross-Filing
Cross-filing is not a consideration in Idaho because elections are
nonpartisan.
ILLINOIS
" Court Structure
Supreme Court; Appellate Court (intermediate appellate court); Circuit
Court (trial court).
" Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
Justices of the supreme court and judges of the appellate court and cir-
cuit court are selected in partisan elections. 173 Supreme court justices
and appellate court judges serve ten-year terms. Circuit court judges
serve six-year terms.
174
" Method and Term of Retention
Justices and judges are retained for additional terms of the same dura-
tion through retention elections.
175
* Mandatory Retirement Age
Justices and judges are deemed to be retired at the age of seventy-
five. 17 6
171. See IDAHO CONST. art. V, § 6 (outlining procedure for electing supreme
court justices and defining terms); id. art. VI, § 7 (prohibiting partisan interfer-
ence with judicial election process); IDAHO CODE § 1-2404(4) (b) (Michie 2003)
(requiring consistency in manner of electing supreme court justices and court of
appeals judges).
172. See IDAHO CONST. art. V, § 11 (defining terms); id. art. VI, § 7 (prohibit-
ing partisan interference with judicial election process).
173. See ILL. CONsr. art. VI, § 12(a).
174. See id. § 10.
175. See id. § 12(d).
176. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 55/1 (2003).
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* Cross-Filing
There is no cross-filing in Illinois. 17
7
INDIANA
" Court Structure
Supreme Court; Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court); Cir-
cuit Court (trial court).
" Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
A judicial nominating commission selects Indiana justices and judges.
The commission consists of seven members-the chiefjustice of the su-
preme court, three members selected by attorneys admitted to practice
and three non-attorney members selected by the governor. 178 Supreme
court justices and court of appeals judges "serve until the next general
election following the expiration of two years from the date of appoint-
ment .... "179 Circuit court judges serve six-year terms. 180 They are
appointed by the governor upon the opening of a vacancy and must
stand for partisan elections at "the first general election following an
appointment by the Governor to fill a vacancy in the office of judge of
the circuit court."1 81
" Method and Term of Retention
At the end of their initial terms, justices on the supreme court and
judges on the court of appeals must run in retention elections for ten-
year terms. 182 To remain in office, a circuit court judge must be re-
elected to the office in the same manner in which the judge was elected
originally. The length of subsequent terms equals the length of the
original term. 1
83
" Mandatory Retirement Age
Justices and judges must retire upon attaining seventy-five years of
age. 184
* Cross-Filing
Cross-filing in Indiana is not a consideration with regard to supreme
court justices and court of appeals judges because they are not elected.
Cross-filing is not permitted for those seeking the position of a circuit
court judge. 185
177. See 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7-12(11) (2003).
178. See IND. CONST. art. 7, § 9. The chief justice of supreme court acts as the
chairman of the commission. See id. The chiefjustice may designate anotherjus-
tice of the Indiana Supreme Court to take the chief justice's place. See id.
179. Id. § 11.
180. See id. § 7.
181. IND. CODE § 3-10-2-11(a)(1) (2003).
182. See IND. CONST. art. 7, § 11.
183. See IND. CODE § 3-10-2-11(a).
184. See id. § 33-5.1-2-25(c).
185. See id. § 3-8-2-16.
[Vol. 49: p. 1
28
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol49/iss1/1
JUDICIAL SELECTION PROCESS
IOWA
" Court Structure
Supreme Court; Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court); Dis-
trict Court (trial court).
" Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
A judicial nominating commission nominates supreme court justices
and court of appeals judges.
[T] he state judicial nominating commission shall be composed
and selected as follows: There shall be not less than three nor
more than eight appointive members, as provided by law, and
an equal number of elective members on such commission, all
of whom shall be electors of the state. The appointive mem-
bers shall be appointed by the governor subject to confirma-
tion by the senate. The elective members shall be elected by
the resident members of the bar of the state. 186
A nominating commission also nominates members of the district
court.
[D] istrict judicial nominating commissions shall be composed
and selected as follows: There shall be not less than three nor
more than six appointive members, as provided by law, and an
equal number of elective members on each such commission,
all of whom shall be electors of the district. All appointive
members shall be selected by the Governor, while all elective
members shall be elected by the resident members of the Bar
of the district. The district judge of such district who is senior
in length of service shall also be a member of such commission
and shall be its chairman. 187
All justices and judges are appointed for an initial term of one year.
" Method and Term of Retention
Following expiration of the one-year initial term, justices and judges
must be elected in retention elections. 188 Supreme court judges may
serve additional terms of eight years; judges on the court of appeals and
district court run for additional six-year terms. 18 9
" Mandatory Retirement Age
"The mandatory retirement age is seventy-two years for all justices of the
supreme court, judges of the court of appeals, and district judges ap-
pointed to office after July 1, 1965." 19 0
186. IOWA CONST. art. V, § 16.
187. Id.
188. See id. § 17.
189. See IOWA CODE § 46.16(1)(b) (2003).
190. Id. § 602.1610.
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* Cross-Filing
Partisan elections do not take place because judges are appointed and
then run in retention elections. Consequently, cross-filing is not a con-
sideration in Iowa.
KANSAS
" Court Structure
Supreme Court; Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court); Dis-
trict Court (trial court).
" Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
The governor fills vacancies on the supreme court by appointing one of
three persons recommended by a nominating commission. 19 1 The ini-
tial term ends on the second Monday in January following the first gen-
eral election that occurs after the justice's one-year term has expired.192
Court of appeals judges are selected in the same way as justices on the
supreme court.' 93
[The nominating commission] shall be composed as follows:
One member, who shall be chairman, chosen from among
their number by the members of the bar who are residents of
and licensed in Kansas; one member from each congressional
district chosen from among their number by the resident
members of the bar in each such district; and one member,
who is not a lawyer, from each congressional district, ap-
pointed by the governor from among the residents of each
such district.' 9 4
There are thirty-one districts. In seventeen of the districts, a nonparti-
san commission forwards a list of approved district court judge candi-
dates to the governor, who appoints a judge from the list. In the
remaining fourteen districts, judges must run in partisan elections. In
both cases, they serve four-year terms.' 9 5
" Method and Term of Retention
After serving an initial term, a supreme courtjustice must run for reten-
tion every six years.' 96 Court of appealsjudges stand for retention every
four years. To remain in office, a district court judge must either run
for re-election (if originally elected) or stand for retention (if ap-
pointed) every four years.
191. See KAN. CONST. art. 3, § 5(a).
192. See id. § 5(c).
193. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-3002(b) (2002).
194. KAN. CONST. art. 3, § 5(e).
195. See id. § 6(a).
196. See id. § 5(c).
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" Mandatory Retirement Age
The mandatory retirement age of justices and judges in Kansas is sev-
enty, but justices and judges may serve out the remainder of their terms
despite reaching that age limit.
197
" Cross-Filing
Cross-filing is not a consideration for the appellate courts in Kansas be-
cause appellate justices and judges are not elected. Cross-filing is not
permitted in districts that have partisan elections.
KENTUCKY
" Court Structure
Supreme Court; Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court); Cir-
cuit Court (trial court).
" Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
All justices and judges are elected in nonpartisan elections. Supreme
court, court of appeals and circuit court judges all serve eight-year
terms.19
8
" Method and Term of Retention
To be retained for additional terms, justices and judges must win addi-
tional nonpartisan elections. 199
" Mandatory Retirement Age
There is no mandatory retirement age.
" Cross-Filing
Cross-filing is not a consideration in Kentucky because elections are
nonpartisan.
LoUISIANA
" Court Structure
Supreme Court; Court of Appeal (intermediate appellate court); Dis-
trict Court (trial court).
" Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
All justices and judges are elected. 20 0 Judges on the court of appeal
serve ten-year terms.20 1 Supreme court justices serve ten-year terms.20 2
District court judges serve six-year terms. 20 3
* Method and Term of Retention
Justices and judges can serve additional terms of equal length by win-
ning additional partisan elections.
197. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-2608(a).
198. See Ky. CONST. § 119.
199. See id. § 117.
200. See LA. CONsT. art. 5, § 22 (A).
201. See id. § 8(C).
202. See id. § 3.
203. See id. § 15(C).
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* Mandatory Retirement Age
Justices and judges must retire at the age of seventy.20 4
" Cross-Filing
Louisiana utilizes an open primary system, so party affiliation does not
matter.
MAINE
" Court Structure
Supreme Judicial Court; Superior Court (trial court). Maine does not
have an intermediate appellate court.
" Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
Justices and judges are appointed by the governor and serve seven-year
terms.
20 5
" Method and Term of Retention
To serve additional terms, justices and judges must be reappointed by
the governor. Justices and judges are customarily reappointed.
* Mandatory Retirement Age
There is no mandatory retirement age.
" Cross-Filing
Cross-filing is not a consideration in Maine because justices and judges
are appointed.
MARYLAND
" Court Structure
Court of Appeals; Court of Special Appeals (intermediate appellate
court); Circuit Court (trial court).20 6
• Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
All appellate court judges are appointed to initial terms of one year.20 7
Circuit court judges must run in nonpartisan elections to serve a fifteen-
year term. 2
0 8
• Method and Term of Retention
When their initial one-year terms expire, appellate court judges must
win retention elections to serve additional ten-year terms.2° 9 A circuit
court judge must win a nonpartisan election to serve a full fifteen-year
term.
2 10
" Mandatory Retirement Age
Judges must retire at the age of seventy. 2 11
204. See id. § 23(B).
205. See ME. CONsT. art. 6, § 4.
206. In Maryland, all jurists are called 'judges."
207. See MD. CONST. pt. I, art. IV, § 5A.
208. See id. § 5.
209. See id. § 5A(c).
210. See id. § 5.
211. See id. § 3.
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* Cross-Filing
Cross-filing is not a consideration in Maryland because judges are ap-
pointed or selected in nonpartisan elections.
MASSACHUSETTS
* Court Structure
Supreme Judicial Court; Appeals Court (intermediate appellate court);
Trial Court. 212
" Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
All judicial officers are nominated and appointed by the governor, with
the advice and consent of a council.2 13 All judicial officers hold their
positions for life during good behavior. 214
" Method and Term of Retention
Judges in Massachusetts serve during good behavior.
" Mandatory Retirement Age
" [U] pon attaining seventy years of age said [judges] shall be retired. " 2 15
" Cross-Filing
Cross-filing is not a consideration in Massachusetts because the gover-
nor appoints all judges.
MICHIGAN
" Court Structure
Supreme Court; Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court); Cir-
cuit Court (trial court).
" Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
Justices on the supreme court are elected in nonpartisan elections and
serve eight-year terms.2 16 Judges on the court of appeals are elected in
nonpartisan elections and serve six-year terms.2 17 Circuit court judges
are also elected in nonpartisan elections and serve six-year terms.2 13
" Method and Term of Retention
Justices and judges can serve additional terms by winning additional
nonpartisan elections.2 1 9
212. In Massachusetts, all jurists are called 'judges."
213. See MAss. CONST. pt. 2, ch. II, § I, art. IX. "There shall be a council for
advising the governor in the executive part of government, to consist of [nine]
persons besides the lieutenant governor, whom the governor, for the time being,
shall have full power and authority, from time to time, at his discretion, to assem-
ble and call together." Id. § III, art. I (alteration in original).
214. See id. ch. III, art. I.
215. Id.
216. See MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
217. See id. § 8 (describing method of attaining office of judge of court of
appeals); id. § 9 (defining term lengths).
218. See id. § 12.
219. See id. §§ 2, 9, 12.
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" Mandatory Retirement Age
Justices and judges who have attained the age of seventy may not serve
additional terms.220
* Cross-Filing
Cross-filing is not a consideration in Michigan because elections are
nonpartisan.
MINNESOTA
* Court Structure
Supreme Court; Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court); Dis-
trict Court (trial court).
" Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
Justices and judges in Minnesota are elected in nonpartisan elections
and serve six-year terms. 22 1
• Method and Term of Retention
At the end of each term, ajustice orjudge must run in another nonpar-
tisan election.
2 22
" Mandatory Retirement Age
Justices and judges must retire at the end of the year they turn seventy
years old.223
" Cross-Filing
Cross-filing is not a consideration in Minnesota because justices and
judges run in nonpartisan elections.
MississipPi
• Court Structure
Supreme Court; Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court); Cir-
cuit Court (trial court law); Chancery Court (trial court equity).
" Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
Supreme court justices are elected in nonpartisan elections and serve
eight-year terms. 224 Court of appeals judges are elected in nonpartisan
elections and serve eight-year terms.2 25 Circuit and chancery court
judges are elected in nonpartisan elections and serve four-year terms. 226
* Method and Term of Retention
To remain in office, ajustice orjudge must be re-elected to the office in
the same manner in which the justice or judge was elected originally.
220. See id. § 19(3).
221. See MINN. CONST. art. VI, §§ 7-8.
222. See id.
223. See MINN. STAT. § 490.125 (2002) (imposing mandatory age limit); id.
§ 490.121, subd. 12 (defining "mandatory retirement date").
224. See Miss. CONST. art. 6, § 145 (describing election procedure for supreme
court judges); id. § 149 (defining term lengths).
225. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 9-4-5 (2003).
226. See Miss. CONST. art. 6, § 153.
[Vol. 49: p. I
34
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol49/iss1/1
JUDICIAL SELECTION PROCESS
The length of subsequent terms equals the length of the original
term.
227
" Mandatory Retirement Age
Justices and judges must retire at the age of sixty-eight. 228
" Cross-Filing
Cross-filing is not permitted in Mississippi.
MISSOURI
" Court Structure
Supreme Court; Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court); Cir-
cuit Court (trial court).2 29
" Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
An appellate judicial commission consisting of two non-lawyers, two law-
yers and one Missouri Supreme Courtjudge recommends judges for the
supreme court and the court of appeals.230 The commission provides
the governor with a list of three candidates from which the governor
must choose. 23 1 After serving initial one-year terms, supreme court and
court of appeals judges are placed on the ballot for the next general
election, which occurs every two years. 2
32
Each county shall have such number of associate circuitjudges
as provided by law. There shall be at least one resident associ-
ate circuit judge in each county. Associate circuit judges shall
be selected or elected in each county. In those circuits where
the circuit judge is selected under section 25 of article 5 of the
constitution the associate circuit judge shall be selected in the
same manner. All other associate circuit judges shall be
elected in the county in which they are to serve.
2 33
Circuit court judges serve initial six-year terms.2 34
" Method and Term of Retention
At the next general election, supreme court justices and court of ap-
peals judges who have served one year in office require approval in re-
tention elections to serve additional twelve-year terms. 235 The circuits
that select judges through partisan elections require those judges to be
227. See id. §§ 145, 153 (defining term lengths); Miss. CODE ANN. § 9-4-5
(same).
228. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 9-3-12.
229. In Missouri, all jurists except for the chief justice of the Supreme Court
of Missouri are called 'judges."
230. See Mo. CONST. art. V, § 25(d) (describing makeup of judicial commis-
sion); id. § 25(a) (detailing judicial recommendation process).
231. See id. § 25(d).
232. See id. § 25(c)(1).
233. Id. § 16.
234. See id. § 19.
235. See id. § 25(c)(1).
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re-elected in partisan elections for additional six-year terms. 23 6 The cir-
cuits that select judges through a commission require the judges to
stand for retention election for additional six-year terms.23
7
" Mandatory Retirement Age
Judges must retire at the age of seventy. 238
* Cross-Filing
Cross-filing is not permitted in Missouri.
MONTANA
" Court Structure
Supreme Court; District Court (trial court). Montana does not have an
intermediate appellate court.
• Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
Justices of the supreme court and judges of the district court are se-
lected in nonpartisan elections. 239 Supreme court justices serve terms
of eight years and district court judges are elected for six-year terms.240
* Method and Term of Retention
To remain in office, ajustice orjudge must be re-elected to the office in
the same manner in which the justice orjudge was elected originally. 24 1
The length of subsequent terms equals the length of the original term.
If there is no one to run against the incumbent, the voters are still given
the opportunity to vote to retain or remove the justice or judge.2 42
* Mandatory Retirement Age
There is no mandatory retirement age.
* Cross-Filing
Cross-filing is not a consideration in Montana because judicial elections
are nonpartisan.
NEBRASKA
* Court Structure
Supreme Court; Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court); Dis-
trict Court (trial court).
" Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
Nebraska has a nine-member judicial nominating commission consist-
ing of one non-voting member of the state supreme court, four lawyers
selected by the state bar and four non-lawyer citizens. 243 The governor
then chooses from a list of at least two candidates who received a major-
236. See Interview by Scott Friedman with Michael Buenger, Administrator,
Missouri State Court (Oct. 8, 2003).
237. See id.
238. See Mo. CONsT. art. V, § 26.
239. See MoNT. CONST. art. VII, § 7(2).
240. See id. § 8.
241. See id. § 8(2).
242. See id. § 8(3).
243. See NEB. CONsT. art. V, § 21(4).
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ity of the votes of the commission members. 244 The appointed justice
or judge serves from the date of appointment plus three full calendar
years.245
* Method and Term of Retention
After the original term of office, a justice or judge must be approved in
a retention election for an additional six-year term.
246
* Mandatory Retirement Age
There is no mandatory retirement age.
• Cross-Filing
Cross-filing is not a consideration in Nebraska because justices and
judges are selected by gubernatorial appointment following nomination
by the judicial nominating commission.
NEVADA
* Court Structure
Supreme Court; District Court (trial court). Nevada does not have an
intermediate appellate court.
* Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
Supreme court justices are elected in nonpartisan elections to serve six-
year terms.24 7 District court judges are also elected in nonpartisan elec-
tions and serve six-year terms.
248
" Method and Term of Retention
To serve additional terms, justices on the supreme court and judges on
the district court must run in additional elections. 249
" Mandatory Retirement Age
Unless the commission on judicial discipline determines that the ad-
vanced age of a justice or judge interferes with work performance, the
commission may not require the justice or judge to retire. 250
" Cross-Filing
Cross-filing is not a consideration in Nevada because elections are
nonpartisan.
NEw HAMPSHIRE
* Court Structure
Supreme Court; Superior Court (intermediate appellate court); District
Court (trial court).
244. See id. § 21(5).
245. See id. § 21(3).
246. See id.
247. See NEv. CoNsT. art. 6, § 3.
248. See id. § 5.
249. See id. §§ 3, 5.
250. See id. § 21.
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* Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
All judicial officers are nominated and appointed by the governor and
an executive council. 25 1 "The 'Judicial Selection Commission' recom-
mends candidates for judgeships to the governor whom they believe are
the most qualified for judicial vacancies. '25 2 The governor then makes
appointments with the advice and consent of the executive council.
"The 11 member Judicial Selection Commission is composed of seven
attorneys and four members of the public."253
" Method and Term of Retention
"[A]I judicial officers duly appointed, commissioned and sworn, shall
hold their offices during good behavior except those for whom a differ-
ent provision is made in this constitution."254
* Mandatory Retirement Age
"No person shall hold the office of judge of any court... after he has
attained the age of seventy years."2 55
" Cross-Filing
Cross-filing is not a consideration in New Hampshire because initial se-
lection is through ajudicial selection commission, the governor and the
executive council.
NEW JERSEY
• Court Structure
Supreme Court; Superior Court (appellate division and trial division).
" Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
The governor nominates and appoints justices of the supreme court
and judges of the superior court with the advice and consent of the New
Jersey Senate.2 56 All justices and judges serve for an initial term of
seven years.
25 7
" Method and Term of Retention
After the initial term, justices and judges must be reappointed. If reap-
pointed, a justice or judge serves during good behavior.2 58
" Mandatory Retirement Age
Justices of the supreme court and judges of the superior court must
retire at the age of seventy.
2 59
251. See N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 46.
252. Judicial Branch: State of New Hampshire, Frequently Asked Questions, avail-
able at http://www.courts.state.nh.us/sitewidelinks/faqindex.htm#Judges (last vis-
ited Nov. 18, 2003).
253. Id.
254. N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 73.
255. Id. art. 78.
256. See N.J. CONST. art. VI, § VI, para. 1.
257. See id. para. 3.
258. See id.
259. See id.
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* Cross-Filing
Cross-filing is not a consideration in NewJersey because initial selection
is through the governor, with the advice and consent of the state
Senate.
NEW MEXICO
" Court Structure
Supreme Court; Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court); Dis-
trict Court (trial court).
" Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
Supreme court justices and court of appeals and district court judges
are elected in partisan elections. 260 Supreme courtjustices and court of
appeals judges serve eight-year terms.2 6 1 District court judges serve six-
year terms.
2 62
" Method and Term of Retention
At the end of their terms, justices and judges must run in retention
elections for additional terms of the same duration and must receive
fifty-seven percent (57%) of the vote. 263
" Mandatory Retirement Age
There is no mandatory retirement age.
" Cross-Filing
Cross-filing is not permitted in New Mexico.
NEW YORK
" Court Structure
Court of Appeals; Supreme Court (appellate division and trial
division) .264
" Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
Ajudicial nominating commission nominates judges to vacancies on the
New York Court of Appeals and the governor selects for appointment,
with the advice and consent of the state Senate, from the list the com-
mission provides. 265
The commission on judicial nomination shall consist of twelve
members of whom four shall be appointed by the governor,
four by the chiefjudge of the court of appeals, and one each
by the speaker of the assembly, the temporary president of the
260. See N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 33.
261. See id.
262. See id.
263. See id.
264. In New York, supreme court (trial division) jurists are called "justices"
and all other jurists are called "judges." This differs from the nomenclature em-
ployed by most states, where the term "justice" designates the members of the
court of last resort rather than the general court of original jurisdiction.
265. See N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 2.
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senate, the minority leader of the senate, and the minority
leader of the assembly. 266
Judges on the court of appeals serve fourteen-year terms.26 7 Judges on
the supreme court (appellate division) are selected from among the jus-
tices of the supreme court (trial division) and serve five-year terms.2 68
Supreme court justices are elected in partisan elections and serve four-
teen-year terms.2 6
9
* Method and Term of Retention
Judges on the court of appeals must be reappointed for additional
terms in the same manner that they were originally selected. At the end
of the designation period of a judge on the supreme court (appellate
division), the judge must be redesignated by the governor for additional
terms.2 7°l To serve for additional terms, supreme court (trial division)
justices must run in an additional election. 27 1
" Mandatory Retirement Age
Justices and judges must retire at age seventy. 272
" Cross-Filing
New York does permit cross-filing. Each party has a convention to select
judicial candidates for the supreme court and prospective justices and
judges are permitted to seek the endorsements of more than one party.
NORTH CAROLINA
" Court Structure
Supreme Court; Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court); Supe-
rior Court (trial court).
" Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
Justices of the supreme court and judges of the court of appeals and
superior court are selected in nonpartisan elections. All justices and
judges serve eight-year terms. 273
* Method and Term of Retention
To remain in office, ajustice orjudge must be re-elected to the office in
the same manner in which the justice or judge was elected originally.
The length of the subsequent term equals the length of the original
term.274
266. Id. § 2(d)(1).
267. See id. § 2(a).
268. See id. § 4(c).
269. See id. § 6(c).
270. See id. § 4.
271. Because the New York Constitution provides for neither the reappoint-
ment nor redesignation of appellate court judges, it is implicit that supreme court
(trial division) judges can only retain their positions through the same manner in
which they were originally elected.
272. See N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 25.
273. See N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 16.
274. See id.
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" Mandatory Retirement Age
"No justice or judge ... may continue in office beyond the last day of
the month in which he attains his seventy-second birthday, but justices
and judges so retired may be recalled for periods of temporary service
"275
" Cross-Filing
Cross-filing is not a consideration in North Carolina because justices
and judges are selected in nonpartisan elections.
NORTH DAKOTA
" Court Structure
Supreme Court; Court of Appeals (reviews decisions of the district court
only when the supreme court so directs); District Court (trial court).
" Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
Supreme court justices are elected in nonpartisan elections for ten-year
terms, "so arranged that one justice is elected every two years." 276 Dis-
trict courtjudges are also elected in nonpartisan elections and serve six-
year terms. 277 The court of appeals is not a standing court; it is con-
vened when necessary.
The Court of Appeals hears only the cases assigned to it by the
Supreme Court. It is composed of three judges chosen from
among active and retired district court judges, retired justices
of the Supreme Court, and attorneys. Temporary court of ap-
peals judges are assigned by the Supreme Court for up to one
year.278
• Method and Term of Retention
To serve additional terms, supreme court justices and district court
judges must be re-elected in nonpartisan elections.2 79
" Mandatory Retirement Age
There is no mandatory retirement age.
" Cross-Filing
Cross-filing is not a consideration in North Dakota because justices and
judges are elected in nonpartisan elections.
275. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A4.20 (2003).
276. N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 7.
277. See id. § 9; see also North Dakota Judicial System, The Structure of the Judi-
cial System, available at http://www.court.state.nd.us/Court/BROCHURE.HTM
(last visited Oct. 1, 2003).
278. North Dakota Judicial System, The Structure of the Judicial System, available
at http://www.court.state.nd.us/Court/BROCHURE.HTM (last visited Oct. 1,
2003).
279. See N.D. CONST. art. VI, §§ 7, 9.
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OHIO
* Court Structure
Supreme Court; Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court); Court
of Common Pleas (trial court).
* Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
Supreme court justices, court of appeals judges and common pleas
judges are elected in nonpartisan elections and serve terms that are not
less than six years.
28 0
" Method and Term of Retention
Justices and judges are re-elected in nonpartisan elections to serve addi-
tional six-year terms.
28 1
* Mandatory Retirement Age
When a justice or judge reaches the age of seventy, the justice or judge
can no longer be re-elected or appointed. The justice or judge may
finish out the term. A retired justice orjudge may also be assigned, with
consent, to active duty.
282
* Cross-Filing
Cross-filing is not a consideration in Ohio because justices and judges
are elected in nonpartisan elections.
OKLAHOMA
" Court Structure
Supreme Court; Court of Criminal Appeals (intermediate appellate
court for criminal cases); Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate
court for civil cases); District Court (trial court).
" Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
Justices and judges in Oklahoma are nominated by a judicial nominat-
ing commission and appointed by the governor. 28 3 The commission is
composed of (1) six members appointed by the governor, (2) six mem-
bers who are members of the Oklahoma Bar Association elected by that
entity and (3) one member who is not admitted to the practice of law in
any state and who is selected by not less than eight of the commission's
members. 284 All justices and judges serve initial one-year terms. 285
* Method and Term of Retention
To serve beyond their original one-year term, judges must run in reten-
tion elections.28 6 Justices and judges so retained serve additional six-
year terms.28
7
280. See OHIO CONST. art. 4, § 6(A)(1)-(3).
281. See id. § 6.
282. See id. § 6(C).
283. See OKLA. CONsT. art. VII-B, § 4; OKLA. STAT. tit. 20, § 30.17 (2002).
284. See OKLA. CONST. art. VII-B, § 3.
285. See id. § 5.
286. See id. § 2.
287. See id. § 5.
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" Mandatory Retirement Age
There is no mandatory retirement age.
* Cross-Filing
Cross-filing is not a consideration in Oklahoma because justices and
judges are appointed.
OREGON
" Court Structure
Supreme Court; Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court); Cir-
cuit Court (trial court).
" Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
Justices of the supreme court and judges of the court of appeals and
circuit court are elected and serve six-year terms.28 8 The elections are
nonpartisan.2
8 9
" Method and Term of Retention
To remain in office, ajustice or judge must be re-elected to the office in
the same manner in which the justice or judge was elected originally.
The length of subsequent terms equals the length of the original
term. 29
0
• Mandatory Retirement Age
Ajustice or judge must retire when the justice or judge reaches the age
of seventy-five. The legislature may set a younger age but may not set it
lower than the age of seventy.
29 1
" Cross-Filing
Cross-filing is not a consideration in Oregon because elections are
nonpartisan.
PENNSYLVANIA
" Court Structure
Supreme Court; Superior Court and Commonwealth Court (intermedi-
ate appellate courts); Court of Common Pleas (trial court).
" Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
Justices and judges of all courts are elected in partisan elections. 292
"The regular term of office of justices and judges shall be ten years
"293
288. See OR. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
289. See OR. RE-v. STAT. § 254.125 (2001) (describing nonpartisan process).
290. See OR. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
291. See id. § la.
292. See PA. CONsT. art. V, § 13(a).
293. Id. § 15(a).
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" Method and Term of Retention
In the last year of the current term of a justice or judge, the justice or
judge may file a declaration to run for retention.2 94 If ajustice orjudge
chooses to run for retention:
[The candidate's n]ame shall be submitted to the electors
without party designation, on a separate judicial ballot . .. to
determine only the question whether he [or she] shall be re-
tained in office .... If a majority favors retention, thejustice or
judge shall serve for the regular term of office. 295
" Mandatory Retirement Age
Justices and judges "shall be retired on the last day of the calendar year
in which they attain the age of 70 years. 296
" Cross-Filing
Cross-filing used to be permitted for justices and judges at all levels of
Pennsylvania courts. It remains permitted in the courts of common
pleas but not in the appellate courts of the Commonwealth. 29 7
RHODE ISLAND
* Court Structure
Supreme Court; Superior Court (trial court). Rhode Island does not
have an intermediate appellate court.
• Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
An independent nonpartisan judicial nominating commission submits a
list of nominees to the governor.298 The governor, with the advice and
consent of the state legislature, then appoints one of the nominees to
the court on which the vacancy has occurred. 299 Justices of the su-
preme court are appointed for life, provided they maintain "good be-
havior. 3 ° °0 The same holds true for superior courtjudges. Thejudicial
nominating commission comprises nine members:
The speaker of the house of representatives shall submit to the
governor a list of at least three (3) attorneys [-the governor
chooses one]; (ii) The president of the senate shall submit to
the governor a list of at least three (3) persons who may be
attorneys and/or members of the public[-the governor
chooses one]; (iii) The speaker of the house of representatives
and the president of the senate shall jointly submit to the gov-
294. See id. § 15(b).
295. Id. The regular term of office for ajustice orjudge in Pennsylvania is ten
years. See id. § 15(a).
296. Id. § 16(b).
297. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2953 (West 2003).
298. See R.I. CONST. art. X, § 4.
299. See id.
300. Id. § 5.
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ernor a list of four (4) members of the public [-the governor
chooses one]; (iv) The minority leader of the house of repre-
sentatives shall submit to the Governor a list of at least three
(3) members of the public [-the governor chooses one]; . . .
(v) The minority leader of the senate shall submit to the gover-
nor a list of at least three (3) members of the public [-the
Governor chooses one]; :-'4 three (3) attorneys the governor
chooses without regard to any of the lists; and one member of
the public the governor chooses without regard to the list. 0 2
" Method and Term of Retention
Justices and judges serve during good behavior.0 3
* Mandatory Retirement Age
There is no mandatory retirement age.
" Cross-Filing
Cross-filing is not a consideration in Rhode Island because selection of
all jurists is accomplished via a nominating commission.
SOUTH CAROLINA
" Court Structure
Supreme Court; Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court); Cir-
cuit Court (trial court).
" Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
A judicial merit selection commission makes recommendations to the
General Assembly to fill vacancies occurring in the courts. The General
Assembly elects justices and judges from the nominees recommended
by the commission.3 0 4 Supreme court justices serve ten-year terms.30 5
Court of appeals judges serve six-year terms.3 0 6 Circuit court judges
also serve six-year terms.3 0 7
" Method and Term of Retention
To serve additional terms, justices and judges must be reapproved by
the General Assembly for additional terms of equal length. 0 8
301. R.I GEN. LAws § 8-16.1-2(a) (1) (2003). The bracketed material that ap-
pears in the quotes is derived from section 8-16.1-2(2) of the Rhode Island General
Laws.
302. See id. § 8-16.1-2(2).
303. See R.I. CONST. art. X, § 5.
304. See S.C. CONsT. art. V, § 27.
305. See id. § 3.
306. See id. § 8; see also South Carolina Judicial Department, Court of Appeals,
available at http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/appeals/index.cfm (last visited Oct. 1,
2003).
307. See S.C. CONST. art. V, § 13; see also South Carolina Judicial Department,
Circuit Courts, available at http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/trial/circuit/index.cfm
(last visited Oct. 1, 2003).
308. See S.C. CONsT. art. V, § 27; see also, e.g., South Carolina Judicial Depart-
ment, Supreme Court, available at http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/supreme/index.
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" Mandatory Retirement Age
Justices and judges must retire at age seventy-two. 30 9
" Cross-Filing
Cross-filing is not a consideration in South Carolina because justices
and judges are selected by the General Assembly.
SOUTH DAKOTA
" Court Structure
Supreme Court; Circuit Court (trial court). South Dakota does not
have an intermediate appellate court.
" Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
Supreme court positions are filled by appointment of the governor from
two or more persons nominated by a judicial qualifications commis-
sion.3 10 The commission consists of two judges of the circuit court,
elected by a judicial conference, three members of the state bar (no
more than two from one party), appointed by the President of the state
bar, and two non-lawyers or non-jurists (not from the same party), ap-
pointed by the governor.3 1- ' Circuit court judges are elected in
"nonpolitical election [s] by the electorate of the circuit each represents
for an eight-year term."3 12
" Method and Term of Retention
Retention of each Supreme Court justice shall, in the manner
provided by law, be subject to approval or rejection on a
nonpolitical ballot at the first general election following the
expiration of three years from the date of his appointment.
Thereafter, each Supreme Court justice shall be subject to ap-
proval or rejection in like manner every eighth year.3 13
Circuit courtjudges must be re-elected to the office in the same manner
in which they were elected originally.3 14 The length of subsequent
terms equals the length of the original term. 31 5
" Mandatory Retirement Age
All justices and judges are:
[A] utomatically retired on the first Tuesday after the first Mon-
day of January next after the general election at which mem-
bers of the Legislature are elected immediately following the
cfm (last visited Oct. 1, 2003) (indicating thatjustices of South Carolina's Supreme
Court may be re-elected for infinite number of terms).
309. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 9-8-60(1) (Law. Co-op. 2002).
310. See S.D. CONST. art. V, § 7.
311. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 16-1A-2 (Michie 2003).
312. S.D. CONST. art. V, § 7.
313. Id.
314. See id.
315. See id.
[Vol. 49: p. 1
46
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol49/iss1/1
JUDICIAJl SELECTION PROCESS
attainment of age seventy of such justice [or judge]. Such jus-
tice [or judge] shall conclude all matters pending before him
unless the Supreme Court makes other provisions for the dis-
position of such matters.3 1 6
* Cross-Filing
Cross-filing is not a consideration in South Dakota because justices and
judges are either appointed or selected in nonpartisan elections.
TENNESSEE
* Court Structure
Supreme Court; Court of Criminal Appeals (intermediate appellate
court); Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court); Circuit Court
(law trial court); Chancery Court (equity trial court).
" Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
When a vacancy occurs on the supreme court, court of criminal appeals
or court of appeals, a judicial selection commission recommends three
candidates to the governor, who selects one of the candidates to fill the
vacancy.3 17 The judicial selection commission is composed of seven-
teen members selected to represent a cross section of the state. 3 18 Cir-
cuit and chancery court judges are elected in partisan elections and
serve eight-year terms.3 19
" Method and Term of Retention
To be retained for a full eight-year term and any additional terms, ap-
pellate court justices and judges run in retention elections. 320 For cir-
cuit and chancery court judges to serve additional terms, they must be
re-elected in partisan elections.3 2'
" Mandatory Retirement Age
A justice or judge reaches senior status at age seventy and may only
continue if the supreme court determines that there is a need for the
justice's or judge's services and that the justice or judge is "physically
and mentally capable of performing valuable judicial service.",3 22
" Cross-Filing
Cross-filing is not permitted in Tennessee.
316. S.D. CODIFIED lAws § 16-1-4.1 (specifying when supreme court justices
are required to retire); id. § 16-6-31 (specifying when circuit court judges are re-
quired to retire).
317. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 174-112 (2003).
318. See id. § 17-4-102.
319. See TENN. CONST. art. X7, § 4.
320. See id. § 3; TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-5-103.
321. See TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 4.
322. TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-2-303.
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TEXAS
" Court Structure
Supreme Court; Court of Criminal Appeals (intermediate appellate
court); Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court); District Court
(trial court).
" Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
Justices on the Supreme Court of Texas are elected in partisan elections
and serve six-year terms. s 23 Judges of the court of criminal appeals and
court of appeals are elected in partisan elections and serve six-year
terms.3 24 District court judges are elected in partisan elections and
serve for four years. 3 25
" Method and Term of Retention
Justices and judges must run in additional partisan elections to serve
additional terms.
* Mandatory Retirement Age
"The office of every such Justice and Judge shall become vacant when
the incumbent reaches the age of seventy-five (75) years or such earlier
age, not less than seventy (70) years, as the Legislature may
prescribe. ",3 26
* Cross-Filing
Texas does not allow cross-filing.
UTAH
" Court Structure
Supreme Court; Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court); Dis-
trict Court (trial court).
* Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
"When a vacancy occurs in a court of record, the Governor shall fill the
vacancy by appointment from a list of at least three nominees certified
to the Governor by the Judicial Nominating Commission having author-
ity over the vacancy."3 27 The Commission comprises eight members-
seven appointed by the governor plus the chief justice of the supreme
court, who does not have a vote. 3 28 No more than four members may
be of the same political party.3 29 "The appointment shall be effective
upon approval of a majority of all members of the Senate. If the Senate
323. See TEX. CONST. art. 5, § 2.
324. See id. §§ 4, 6.
325. See id. § 7.
326. Id. § 1-a.
327. UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 8(1). "Judicial nominating commissions, cre-
ated in Section 20A-12-102 and 20A-12-103, are repealedJuly 1, 2004." UTAH CODE
ANN. § 63-55-220 (2003).
328. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-12-102 (defining appellate court nominating
commission); id. § 20A-12-103 (defining trial court nominating commission).
329. See id. §§ 20A-12-102, 20A-12-103.
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fails to approve the appointment, the office shall be considered vacant
and a new nominating process shall commence." 3" 0
" Method and Term of Retention
Each appointee to a court of record shall be subject to an un-
opposed retention election at the first general election held
more than three years after appointment. Following initial
voter approval, each Supreme Court justice every tenth year,
and each judge of other courts of record every sixth year, shall
be subject to an unopposed retention election at the corre-
sponding general election.
3 -1
" Mandatoy Retirement Age
A judge shall retire upon attaining the age of seventy-five. 3 2
" Cross-Filing
Cross-filing is not a consideration in Utah because initial selection is
through legislative and gubernatorial appointment.
VERMONT
" Court Structure
Supreme Court; Superior Court (intermediate appellate court); District
Court (trial court).
* Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
"The Governor, with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall fill a
[udicial] vacancy . . .from a list of nominees presented by a judicial
nominating body established by the General Assembly having authority
to apply reasonable standards of selection." 333 The judicial nominating
commission is composed of eleven members: two non-attorney mem-
bers appointed by the governor, three members selected by the Senate,
three members selected by the House of Representatives, and three
members elected by attorneys admitted to the supreme court.334 In the
groups of three chosen by the Senate and the House of Representatives,
all may not be from one party and only one can be an attorney. 335 Jus-
tices of the supreme court and justices and judges of the subordinate
courts serve an initial term of six years.33 6
* Method and Term of Retention
At the end of the initial six year term and at the end of each six
year term thereafter, such justice or judge may give notice in
the manner provided by law of a desire to continue in office.
330. UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 8(3).
331. Id. § 9.
332. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 49-17-701.
333. VT. CONST. ch. 2, § 32.
334. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 601 (2003).
335. See id. at § 601 (b) (2)-(3).
336. See VT. CONST. ch. 2, § 34.
2004]
49
Newman and Isaacs: Historical Overview of the Judicial Selection Process in the Unit
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2004
VILIANOVA LAWr REVIEW
When such justice orjudge gives the required notice, the ques-
tion of continuance in office shall be submitted to the General
Assembly and the justice or judge shall continue in office for
another term of six years unless a majority of the members of
the General Assembly voting on the question vote against con-
tinuation in office. 
33 7
* Mandatory Retirement Age
Justices and judges must retire at the end of the calendar year in which
they attain the age of seventy.3 8
* Cross-Filing
Cross-filing is not a consideration in Vermont because initial selection is
through legislative and gubernatorial appointment.
VIRGINIA
" Court Structure
Supreme Court; Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court); Cir-
cuit Court (trial court).
" Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
The justices of the Supreme Court shall be chosen by the vote
of a majority of the members elected to each house of the Gen-
eral Assembly for terms of twelve years. The judges of all other
courts of record shall be chosen by the vote of a majority of the
members elected to each house of the General Assembly for
terms of eight years.3 39
" Method and Term of Retention
Justices and judges are retained in the same manner in which they were
originally selected.
* Mandatory Retirement Age
"Any member who attains seventy years of age shall be retired twenty
days after the convening of the next regular session of the General
Assembly. 340
• Cross-Filing
Cross-filing is not a consideration in Virginia as justices and judges are
selected by the state legislature.
WASHINGTON
* Court Structure
Supreme Court; Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court); Supe-
rior Court (trial court).
337. Id.
338. See id. § 35.
339. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7.
340. VA. CODE ANN. § 51.1-305.B1 (Michie 2003).
[Vol. 49: p. I
50
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol49/iss1/1
JUDICIAL SELECTION PROCESS
" Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
Justices and judges for all courts are selected in nonpartisan elec-
tions. 4 1 Supreme court justices and court of appeals judges serve six-
year terms; superior court judges serve four-year terms.3 42
" Method and Term of Retention
To remain in office, ajustice orjudge must be re-elected to the office in
the same manner in which the justice or judge was elected originally.
The length of subsequent terms equals the length of the original
term.
343
" Mandatory Retirement Age
Justices and judges must retire at the end of the calendar year in which
they attain the age of seventy-five. 344
" Cross-Filing
Cross-filing is not a consideration in Washington because elections are
nonpartisan.
WEST VIRGINIA
" Court Structure
Supreme Court of Appeals; Circuit Court (trial court). West Virginia
does not have an intermediate appellate court.
" Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
Justices and judges of all courts are selected in elections. 345 The legisla-
ture determines by way of law whether the elections are to be partisan
or nonpartisan. 346 Supreme court of appeals justices are elected to
twelve-year terms and circuit court judges are elected to eight-year terms
through partisan elections. 347
" Method and Term of Retention
To remain in office, a justice or judge must be re-elected in a partisan
election.3 48 The length of subsequent terms equals the length of the
original term. 349
" Mandatory Retirement Age
There is no mandatory retirement age. Nevertheless:
[T] he supreme court of appeals is authorized.., to retire any
... justice, judge or magistrate who is eligible for retirement
under the West Virginia judges' retirement system (or any suc-
341. See WASH. CONST. art. IV, §§ 3, 5, 30.
342. See id.
343. See id.
344. See id. § 3(a).
345. See W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2 (defining election of and length of term
forjustices of supreme court of appeals); id. § 5 (defining election of and length of
term for judges of circuit courts).
346. See id. §§ 2, 5.
347. See id.
348. See id.
349. See id.
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cessor or substituted retirement system for justices, judges and
magistrates of this state) and who, because of advancing years
and attendant physical or mental incapacity, should not, in the
opinion of the supreme court of appeals, continue to serve as a
justice, judge or magistrate.3 5 °1
* Cross-Filing
Cross-filing is not permitted in West Virginia.
WISCONSIN
* Court Structure
Supreme Court; Court of Appeals (intermediate appellate court); Cir-
cuit Court (trial court).
" Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
Justices and judges of all courts are selected in nonpartisan elections.3 5 1
Supreme court justices serve ten-year terms and court of appeals and
circuit court judges serve six-year terms. 352
• Method and Term of Retention
To remain in office, ajustice orjudge must be re-elected to the office in
the same manner in which the justice or judge was elected originally.- 53
The length of subsequent terms equals the length of the original
term. 3
54
* Mandatory Retirement Age
Justices and judges cannot serve beyond the first July thirty-first follow-
ing the date on which they attain the age of seventy. 355
* Cross-Filing
Cross-filing is not a consideration in Wisconsin because elections are
nonpartisan.
WYOMING
• Court Structure
Supreme Court; District Court (trial court). Wyoming does not have an
intermediate appellate court.
• Method of Selection and Initial Term of Office
Justices of the supreme court and judges of the district court are chosen
through merit selection by a judicial nominating commission and ap-
pointment by the governor.3 56
350. Id. § 8.
351. See Wis. CONsT. art. VII, §§ 4(1), 5(2), 7.
352. See id.
353. See id.
354. Id. §§ 4, 5, 7.
355. See id. § 24.
356. See Wvo. CONsT. art. 5, § 4(b).
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The commission shall consist of seven members, one of whom
shall be the chiefjustice [or his designee from members of the
Supreme Court], who shall be chairman thereof. In addition
to the chiefjustice, or his designee, three resident members of
the bar engaged in active practice shall be elected by the Wyo-
ming state bar and three electors of the state not admitted to
practice law shall be appointed by the Governor .... 357
"Each justice or judge selected under these provisions shall serve for
one year after his appointment and until the first Monday in January
following the next general election after the expiration of such year."35 8
" Method and Term of Retention
At such general election, the justice or judge must run for retention.3 5 1
A supreme court justice who is retained serves an additional eight-year
term and, at the expiry of such term, can run for subsequent terms of
identical duration. 360 A district court judge who is retained serves an
additional six-year term and, at the expiry of such term, can run for
subsequent terms of identical duration.-1'
" Mandatory Retirement Age
Justices and judges must retire upon reaching seventy years of age.3 62
" Cross-Filing
Cross-filing.is not a consideration in Wyoming because initial selection
is through a nominating commission.
357. Id. § 4(c).
358. Id. § 4(g).
359. See id.
360. See id. § 4(f).
361. See id. §§ 4(f), 19.
362. See id. § 5.
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